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The paper discusses the tension which occurred between the notions of set (with measure) and (trial-)
sequence (or—to a certain degree—between nondenumerable and denumerable sets) when used in the founda-
tions of probability theory around 1920. The main mathematical point was the logical need for measures in
order to describe general nondiscrete distributions, which had been tentatively introduced before (1919) based
on von Mises’s notion of the “Kollektiv.” In the background there was a tension between the standpoints of
pure mathematics and “real world probability” (in the words of J.L. Doob) at the time. The discussion and pub-
lication in English translation (in Appendix) of two critical letters of November 1919 by the “pure” mathema-
tician Felix Hausdorff to the engineer and applied mathematician Richard von Mises compose about one third
of the paper. The article also investigates von Mises’s ill-conceived effort to adopt measures and his misinter-
pretation of an influential book of Constantin Carathéodory. A short and sketchy look at the subsequent devel-
opment of the standpoints of the pure and the applied mathematician—here represented by Hausdorff and von
Mises—in the probability theory of the 1920s and 1930s concludes the paper.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel diskutiert die Spannung zwischen den Begriffen (messbare) Menge und (Versuchs-) Folge
(oder—bis zu einem gewissen Grad—zwischen überabzählbaren und abzählbaren Mengen) in ihrer Verwen-
dung in den Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung um 1920. Der wichtigste mathematische Punkt
war die logische Notwendigkeit von Maßen für die Beschreibung allgemeiner, nicht-stetiger Verteilungen, die
zuvor (1919) vorläufig durch von Mises’ Begriff des “Kollektivs” definiert worden waren. Im Hintergrund steht
eine Spannung zwischen den Standpunkten der reinen Mathematik und der Auffassung der
“Wahrscheinlichkeit als Wirklichkeitsphänomen” (in den Worten von J.L. Doob) zur damaligen Zeit. Die Disk-
ussion und Publikation in Englisch (im Anhang) von zwei kritischen Briefen, die der “reine” Mathematiker
Felix Hausdorff im November 1919 an den Ingenieur und angewandten Mathematiker Richard von Mises sch-
rieb, umfasst etwa ein Drittel der Arbeit. Diese untersucht auch von Mises’ verunglückten Versuch, Maße in0315-0860/$ - see front matter  2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 205seine Theorie zu integrieren, insbesondere seine fehlerhafte Rezeption des einflussreichen Buchs von Constantin
Carathéodory. Ein kurzer und skizzenhafter Ausblick auf die weitere Entwicklung der Standpunkte reiner und
angewandter Mathematiker in der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie der 1920er und 1930er Jahre—hier repräsentiert
durch Hausdorff und von Mises—beschließt den Artikel.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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It is well known that within the efforts to create new foundations for probability theory
in the first decades of the 20th century philosophical and pragmatic considerations about
expediency and rigor, and about the ontological status and the position of probability the-
ory inside or outside mathematics, played an important role. Emile Borel’s renunciation to
a large extent of his own brainchild, the theory of measure, within his approach to proba-
bility [Barone/Novikoff, 1977/78; Knobloch, 1987; Plato, 1994; Hochkirchen, 1999], and the
predominance of sets (Kolmogorov) over logic statements (Keynes) in probability theory
for pragmatic reasons [Freudenthal/Steiner, 1966, 190] have been repeatedly discussed in
the historical literature. The resentment among many statisticians and probabilists against
the “mathematization of probability by measure theory” [Doob, 1994, 157] well into the
second half of the 20th century and—opposed to that—the increasing purification of prob-
ability theory and parts of statistics in a zeal of probabilists “in self-defense” [Doob, 1976,
204] to gain recognition among pure mathematicians have been mentioned as well. The pio-
neer of the measure-theoretic approach to probability, the American Joseph L. Doob
(1910–2004), recognized toward the end of the century that1 Fo
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at thethe relation between the real world probability and mathematical probability has been
simultaneously the bane of and inspiration for the development of mathematical prob-
ability. [Doob, 1994, 158]One revealing historical episode of this relation is the subject of the present paper. Its
main actors are the mathematician Felix Hausdorff (1868–1942)1 and the engineer with
strong mathematical inclinations Richard von Mises (1883–1953).2
Richard von Mises’s peculiar notion of axiomatics in probability theory and the incon-
sistencies of his temporarily influential approach have received attention from mathemati-
cians and historians alike [Martin-Löf, 1969; Hochkirchen, 1999; Siegmund-Schultze, 2006,
466–473], although so far without discussing von Mises’s attitude to measure theory and his
dialogue with Hausdorff.r a recent biography in English see Purkert [2008]. Hausdorff’s Collected Works, edited at
ger-Verlag, which will compose nine volumes of which five have appeared so far, are based on
apers in Bonn. See, e.g., Hausdorff [2006a]. The volume with number I, not yet published, will
in a comprehensive scientific biography of Hausdorff, written by E. Brieskorn.
r a recent biographical study see Siegmund-Schultze [2004a]. Von Mises’s Selected Papers have
published in two volumes [Mises, 1963/64]. Richard von Mises’s Papers HUG 4574 are located
Harvard University Archives in Cambridge, MA.
206 R. Siegmund-SchultzeAlso, von Mises’s broader effort for a renewal of applied mathematics at the same time,
around 1920, has rarely been considered when commenting on his probability theory. It
seems, however, to this writer that this context is important for understanding of the further
development of probability theory in the years that followed. It is only against this back-
ground that one can realize von Mises as a mediator between “real world probability”
and “mathematical probability” in the sense of Doob and therefore as both a hampering
and an inspiring actor in an ongoing discussion.
While probability theory was about to receive rigorous foundations, applied mathemat-
ics was also emerging as a renewed and reputable and socially established field of research
in the first decades of the 20th century following a period of predominantly theoretical or
“pure” mathematics in the 19th century. One of the first manifestations of this new devel-
opment was Richard von Mises’s Institute for Applied Mathematics at the University of
Berlin of the 1920s, which had been preceded in 1904 by the establishment of the first full
professorship of applied mathematics in Germany, held by Carl Runge in Göttingen. The
cognitive ideals of applied mathematics, which reflected many of the new demands for a
systematic approach to the engineering sciences, were even around 1920 not fully estab-
lished. They developed gradually, however, as a result of practical work within the disci-
pline, directed and accompanied by programmatic declarations such as von Mises’s
article [Mises, 1921] in the first issue of the new journal Zeitschrift für Angewandte Math-
ematik und Mechanik, founded by himself together with leading engineers.
Relative to the triangle of engineering sciences, mathematical physics, and applied math-
ematics, the objectives of probability theory and its ally, mathematical statistics—both still
lacking secure and promising foundations—remained unsettled at about 1920. Probability
theory had brought new fields of application (biometrics, insurance, economy, psychology)
into the realm of mathematics. However, just how much of a hybrid discipline probability
theory was bound to remain and how far into pure mathematics it should reach with its
foundations and its methods remained unclear at the time and during much of the 1920s
and 1930s. There was a general understanding that mathematics could only work through,
and be based on, logical rigor and consistency and, in particular, that the “axiomatic” spirit
of modern mathematics had to have implications for both applied mathematics and prob-
ability theory. But how much of the “intuitive potential” of the prospective applications
should and could be built into probability theory was not clear at all. Certainly a balance
had to be struck between the need to secure permanent stimuli from the applications and
the requirement to have a mathematically viable and logically sound theory. Moreover, the
very notion of application and the predilections and theoretical skills of the practitioners of
probability changed over the years.
The new source used in the present article consists of two critical letters written by Felix
Hausdorff, at that time in Greifswald, to Richard von Mises (Dresden) in November 1919.3
The letters, which were located by the author in 2004, have recently been published in Ger-
man in the Felix Hausdorff edition [Hausdorff, 2006b].4 They are published here for the
first time in English translation in Appendix. Within the article they receive a historical
commentary dealing with the situation in probability theory at the time. Prior to 2004,3 The letters are located in the Harvard University Archives in Cambridge, MA, at HUG 4574.5.3.
4 The letters were communicated to the editors of the Hausdorff-edition by the author. Hausdorff
[2006b] is accompanied by a short commentary from the standpoint of modern probability theory
[Chatterji, 2006], which does not go into the historical context of the time, which will be prioritized in
the present article.
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through a “correction” published by von Mises [1920a]. A very short and apt remark by
Krengel [1990, 462] regarding Hausdorff’s criticism of von Mises appears to have been
based on additional information, since it cannot be obtained from Mises [1920a] alone.5
Good mathematicians—for all their insistence on rigor—are usually not pedantic in dis-
cussions with their colleagues when they try to grasp the theoretical core of a problem.
Therefore it is interesting—from a historical standpoint—to see which misunderstandings
of a subjective and objective nature occurred in the discussions between Hausdorff and
von Mises. It will be shown that a tension existed between two approaches to probability,
a more modern one based on sets and measures and a more classical-analytical one based
on sequences. This tension had partly objective theoretical reasons, but can also be related
to the different attitudes of the “pure” mathematician Hausdorff and the “applied” math-
ematician von Mises. A full understanding of von Mises’s somewhat singular attitude seems
possible only when considering his empiricist philosophy of mathematics.6
2. Von Mises’s criticism of Hausdorff’s Grundzüge, his notion of the Kollektiv (1919), and
Hausdorff’s two letters from November 1919
In his famous article “Foundations of the calculus of probability” [Grundlagen der
Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung] in the Mathematische Zeitschrift of 1919, Richard von Mises
criticized attempts to “even further extend the notion ‘probability,’ which is already bur-
dened by ambiguities.”7 His main point of criticism was Émile Borel’s investigations on
“normal numbers.”8 Von Mises maintained that the notion of randomness was ignored
in these investigations, and also that “the law of multiplication for the probability (for
instance of the occurrence of two consecutive zeros) was no longer generally valid.”9 In
addition and in this context, von Mises referred critically in a footnote to Felix Hausdorff’s
Grundzüge der Mengenlehre of 1914, where on page 417 Hausdorff had introduced the word
“probability” as5 An
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9 Mthe quotient of the measure of a point set divided by the measure of the set in which that-
point set is contained. [Mises, 1919b, 66]e-mail enquiry was replied to by Krengel, who said that he does not recall the evidence which
d used in 1990.
e a few remarks in Section 7.
. .den schon ohnehin durch mancherlei Vieldeutigkeiten belasteten Gebrauch des Ausdruckes
rscheinlichkeit’ . . . noch weiter auszudehnen” [Mises, 1919b, 66]. All translations from German
nglish in this article are mine if not indicated otherwise. For explanation, the original German
ssion is sometimes added in brackets. The German original is given in full for sources that are
ult to check.
rel’s work of 1909 on “denumerable probabilities” was an investigation of the asymptotic
ior of the relative frequency with which individual digits occur in the q-adic representation of
umbers. The question was whether real numbers behaved “normal” in a previously defined
. Borel proved in this work a predecessor theorem of what today is called the “strong law of
numbers,” which Hausdorff established for the first time rigorously with measure-theoretic
ods in Hausdorff [1914a].
ises [1919b, 66].
208 R. Siegmund-SchultzeIn von Mises’s opinion, Hausdorff’s notion of probability was too distant from applica-
tions and too unspecific for a theory of probability to be built upon it, because it did not con-
tain a hint of the occurrence of events in an infinite series of trials and no direct reference to
randomness either.10 Most likely von Mises had no principled mathematical reservations
against the modern notion of (linear) measure of point sets introduced by H. Lebesgue which
Hausdorff, in the concluding tenth chapter “Contents of Point Sets” of his book, used for
probabilistic considerations. On one hand, Hausdorff had himself acknowledged that Lebes-
gue’s notion provided only a very special probability measure, a “from the general point of
view arbitrary” definition of probability [Hausdorff, 1914a, 417]. On the other hand, the cen-
tral importance of the Lebesgue measure for a general theory of measures had become much
clearer at the time of the publication of von Mises’s 1919 work.11
Unfortunately for von Mises, on the very same p. 66, which contained his justified crit-
icism mentioned above,12 he made a mathematical mistake when proposing his own, alter-
native foundation of the notion of probability (see below). This mistake, combined with
von Mises’s criticism, made a response by Hausdorff almost inevitable. On 2 and 10
November 1919, Hausdorff wrote two letters from Greifswald to von Mises in Dresden,
criticizing von Mises’s definition of probability based on two fundamental “Forderungen”
[postulates, axioms].
Before going into von Mises’s relation to the measure theory of his time and into Haus-
dorff’s criticism I reproduce here the first of the two “postulates,” with which von Mises
introduced his notion of probability (based on so-called Kollektivs). This will be done in
exactly the same form and notation as on p. 55 of von Mises’s “Foundations of the calculus
of probability”:10 To
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shortLet (e) be an infinite sequence of objects of thought [gedachter Dinge], which we will
briefly refer to as ‘Elements’ e1, e2, e3, . . . To each element corresponds as a ‘label’ [Merk-
mal] a system of values of the k real variables x1, x2, . . . xk, i.e., a point of the k-dimen-
sional ‘label space’ [Merkmalraum] and we assume that not all elements and even not all
except finitely many elements have the same label. We call such a sequence of elements
‘Kollektiv’ (i.e., collection [Sammelgegenstand]) K, if the correspondence between the ele-
ments and the labels satisfies the following postulates (axioms) I and II.be sure Hausdorff did not—at this particular place in his book—aim at the foundations of the
y of probability proper. He stressed instead that “theorems on the measure of point sets might
more familiar when formulated in the language of probability theory” [Hausdorff, 1914a/2002,
16]. It is remarkable that Hausdorff talked here about the “probability for a point of M to
g to the set P” (p. 417). That means he did not speak directly about the “probability of M” and
wledged that this notion, as it is given in von Mises’s axiom (postulate) I to be criticized by
dorff later, had to be defined by the occurrence of individual labels (points).
pers by Lebesgue [1910], Radon [1913], and Carathéodory [1914] had shown this fact for Rn
even for abstract spaces. In 1938 Carathéodory wrote in a letter to B. Jessen, quoted in
giadou’s biography: “It is very remarkable that the absolutely abstract measure functions and
tieltjes integrals are not considerably more general than the Lebesgue linear content”
giadou, 2004, 112].
at von Mises’s criticism was indeed largely justified will not be discussed in detail in the present
e. Von Mises’s insistence on a definition of “randomness,” as he attempted it in his second
late for probability, was a somewhat lesser issue in Hausdorff’s letters, though Hausdorff
ted that postulate as strongly as the first one. See below the excursion in Section 6 with some
remarks.
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Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 209Postulate I. Existence of the limits. Let A be an arbitrary set of points within the label space
and NA the number of those among the first N elements of the sequence whose label is a
point of A, then for each A there exists the limitlim
N¼1
NA
N
¼ W A ð1ÞThis limit we call—provided postulate II is satisfied too—the ‘probability for the occur-
rence of a label belonging to A within a collective [Kollektiv] K.’ [Mises, 1919b, 55,
emphasis by von Mises]This means that von Mises introduced probability as a limit of relative frequencies in
sequences of labels (Kollektivs)13 with respect to given sets and not immediately as a mea-
sure of sets, as in the theory of probability today.14 However, von Mises understood his def-
inition as a special set function and tried to indicate the possibility of the construction of a
bridge toward measure theory.
Hausdorff’s letters of November 1919 showed basically that such a bridge cannot be
built. Although we do not know von Mises’s answers to Hausdorff’s letters,15 the latter give
enough indications and stimuli for the discussion of some interesting points of the theoret-
ical consolidation of the calculus of probability around 1920. However, such a discussion
requires drawing on further archival sources and on some of von Mises’s later publications,
which partly resulted as reactions to Hausdorff’s letters. To a certain extent the historical
interpretation has to remain hypothetical, above all for lack of von Mises’s replies but also
due to certain contradictions in von Mises’s positions.
No probabilist-mathematician doubts the importance of the notion of relative frequency
which, for instance, has a central role to play in Jacob I Bernoulli’s weak law of large numbers.
The problem remains whether the limit of relative frequencies is suitable as a fundamental
notion in the mathematical theory of probability.16 The mathematical core of the controversy
between Hausdorff and von Mises was the discussion of two properties—in a certain way
interconnected to each other—which limits of relative frequencies generally do not possess.
These limits are—interpreted as set functions—not defined for arbitrary subsets, except for
the case of very trivial probability distributions such as discrete (“arithmetic”) ones. Unlike
measure functions, they are in general not countably additive (r-additive) either.n Mises chose as plural “Kollektivs” rather than as usual in German “Kollektive” [Mises,
, 58]. Apparently he wanted to underscore the special and scientific character of his notion.
e modern theory does this in a certain contrast even to Hausdorff, as remarked above.
n Mises’s personal diaries allow us to conclude that he wrote a total of three letters to
dorff in response. They are not traceable in Hausdorff’s estate in Bonn. They were probably
written (as Hausdorff’s two letters were), since there do not exist copies in von Mises’s papers
e Harvard University Archives either. Von Mises did not have a typewriter at that time but
ned one soon afterwards. One reads in his diaries for 10 December 1919: “Occupied with
’s manuscript. Find lack of typewriter very annoying.” [“Mit der Erledigung des Pólyaschen
eschäftigt. . . . Empfinde sehr stark den Mangel einer Schreibmaschine.”]. Von Mises kept
nal diaries for almost 50 years with daily entries in shorthand, using the German system
lsberger. See Harvard University Archives HUG 4574.2, Diaries 1903–1952.
e American probabilist J.L. Doob put it this way “It is perhaps unfortunate that Professor von
s’ treatment of probability problems, based on typical sequences (‘collectives’, ‘admissible
ers’), is commonly called the ‘frequency theory.’ It is clear to any reader of our papers that the
of frequency, at least in the discussion of the relation of mathematics to practice, is no more
mental to one approach than to the other.” [Mises/Doob, 1941, 216].
210 R. Siegmund-SchultzeBoth properties are connected to Postulate I, and von Mises had apparently assumed
that they are “generally” satisfied. This “mathematical core” of the controversy was basi-
cally approached only in Hausdorff’s second letter from November 10, 1919, while the first
letter was for the most part a misunderstanding caused by an ambiguous formulation in
von Mises’s article.17
3. Von Mises’s relation to measure and set theory: his general notion of a probability
distribution and his partly misleading, partly ill-informed reference to Carathéodory [1918]
A short look at von Mises’s fundamental work [Mises, 1919b] shows that—although he
was not originally interested in a measure-theoretic foundation of probability theory—the
modern theory of measure nevertheless forced itself even on von Mises, as much as he tried
to avoid it.
Indeed, the increasing variety of probability distributions occurring in the applications at
that time made the search for a general unifying theory imperative. No doubt von Mises
saw that increasingly complicated probability distributions occurred in applications in biol-
ogy, physics, astronomy, statistics, and insurance mathematics. This called for a general set-
theoretic approach. In particular, it had become clear that probability distributions that
could not be reduced to discrete ones did not necessarily possess representations as classical
integrals over “densities.” And even if densities existed, they could not necessarily be
reduced to traditional ones such as the Gaussian “bell curve”.18
After introducing the label set M [Merkmalmenge] as the set of those points of the label
space that theoretically can occur in the Kollektiv,19 Von Mises introduced in the following
manner the general notion of a probability distribution as a set function, first based only on
his Postulate I:17 As
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19 ThThe totality of WA—values for all point sets A of the label space constitutes the distri-
bution [Verteilung]; it is sufficient to consider only such A that are subsets of M. One
can imagine the function WA as a (partly continuous, partly discontinuous) distribution
of the mass 1 over the points of M. [Mises, 1919b, 56]Now, as is well known, it were predominantly French mathematicians around 1900 who
had provided the modern theory of real functions and thus created crucial theoretical tools
for investigating the mathematical connection between general set functions and generalwill be shown, the remark [Chatterji, 2006, 830] in Chatterji’s valuable commentary, according
ich von Mises based his published correction [Mises, 1920a] on Hausdorff’s first letter while he
ot understand Hausdorff’s second letter, is not fully justified. The first letter is, however,
rtant in its criticism of von Mises’s Postulate II. See below, Section 6.
is remarkable that an early paper of 1901 by Hausdorff, which originated in the context of
ance mathematics, error theory, and theoretical astronomy, stressed (by an example) that “the
ulation of a large number of partial errors does not necessarily result in Gauss’ law” [“dass
em Zusammenwirken einer grossen Zahl von Partialfehlern keineswegs immer das Gausssche
z resultieren muss”] [Hausdorff, 1901, 170]. Von Mises used this example in the first of his two
bilistic works [Mises, 1919a, 54], thus making Hausdorff’s example better known. See Purkert
, 579/8], who comments on Hausdorff [1901]. Similar examples from the English biometric
l (K. Pearson) were noticed and distributed by von Mises too. See a quotation in Mises [1928,
is means, basically, the elementary events that can occur in a trial.
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surable sets on the one hand, and functions of bounded variation, monotonic functions, and
Lebesgue and Stieltjes integral on the other, played a central role here.
Von Mises was well aware of the special, and by no means negligible, role that sets of
probability 0 would play in a future rigorous and general theory of probability. He said,
for instance, [1919b, 56]:20 “W
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24 AnWA = 0 is not always equivalent to impossibility, WA = 1 not always to “certainty” of
A,20adding in a footnote as an explanation:This important deviation from the ordinary theory is indeed quite necessary (and occa-
sionally mentioned) if one considers any kind of continuous distribution. For instance in
the Gaussian error theory each error has probability zero, but each error is possible.21We know also that von Mises, whose training as an engineer between 1901 and 1905 at
the Vienna Technical University had included a strong mathematical component, was in a
general sense well informed about modern developments in the theories of functions and
measures in which, incidentally, Austrian mathematicians played an important part. Von
Mises was a good friend of, and in constant contact with, Ernst Fischer and Eduard Helly,
who are respectively well known for their contributions to the proof of the Riesz–Fischer
theorem (1907) and for fundamental theorems on monotonic functions (Helly around
1912).22 Between 1915 and 1918, as an officer in the Austrian Airforce, von Mises listened
to talks given by Johann Radon in Vienna.23 In 1919 he discussed the central limit theorem
with George Pólya (see below), who was Hungarian-born and therefore had close relations
with Austrian mathematicians. In the 1920s von Mises repeatedly consulted Hans Hahn in
Vienna about recent results in the theory of real functions.24A = 0 ist nicht immer gleichbedeutend mit Unmöglichkeit, WA = 1 nicht immer mit, Sicherheit’
.”
iese scheinbar nicht unwesentliche Abweichung von der üblichen Theorie ist tatsächlich ganz
ässlich (und schon gelegentlich ausgesprochen), wenn man irgendwelche Fälle stetiger
ilungen in Betracht zieht. Z.B. hat in der Gaußschen Fehlertheorie jede Fehlergröbe die
scheinlichkeit null, aber jede Fehlergröbe ist möglich.”
equent meetings with Fischer, Helly, and Pólya are documented in von Mises’s personal diaries.
Mises also kept scientific diaries in German longhand. They allow us to conclude that as early
13 he used Stieltjes integrals in a probabilistic context.
is, too, can be concluded from his personal diaries. One does not, however, find in the
ctive entries too much excitement about Radon’s talks. One of them is not commented on at all
.15); the other two are described as “rather good” [ganz gut, 18.2.16] and as “mediocre”
ig, 3.5.18], respectively. Also, Radon’s major work of 1913 on absolutely additive set functions
arently nowhere cited in von Mises’s work. That von Mises finally connected to Carathéodory
robably be explained by the fact that Radon’s work went more in the direction of the
opment of the notion of the integral than of the notion of measure. Even Carathéodory [1918]
ions Radon only marginally, and it has been argued [Bourbaki 1971, p. 267] that the different
aches of Radon [1913] and Carathéodory [1914/1918] led to the bifurcation of integration
y into two schools, where integral and measure had priority, respectively.
example for these contacts is given below in Section 7.
212 R. Siegmund-SchultzeAs an example of von Mises’s indirect involvement in the discussion, I quote here the
following passage from a postcard that Ernst Fischer wrote to von Mises in 1910, com-
menting on a paper by Frigyes Riesz, Fischer’s erstwhile competitor in the proof of the
Riesz–Fischer theorem:25 Ha
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of “eJust look how polite F. Riesz has now become in his attitude towards me. Comptes Ren-
dus 14 mars 1910. If one could prove this directly and if one could give reasonable con-
ditions for monotonic a(x), this would be without doubt the real foundation for Stieltjes’
work and therefore also for Hilbert’s. Greetings u.25Fischer’s postcard is from a time when the deeper connections between Lebesgue’s and
Stieltjes’s integrals and their general importance for the representation of measures on the
real continuum had still to be discovered. This happened finally in the works of Lebesgue
[1910] and Radon [1913].26
It was without doubt this general mathematical background that influenced von Mises’s
two fundamental papers on probability theory, which appeared in 1919 in the Mathemat-
ische Zeitschrift. Indeed, one has to mention now that von Mises’s paper on the “Grund-
lagen” [Foundations] had been preceded by an earlier paper in the same journal, entitled
“Fundamental theorems of the calculus of probability” [Mises, 1919a]. The two works com-
plemented each other but had different aims. The first, submitted in August 1918, intro-
duced general distributions as monotonic functions.27 These were not necessarily
representable as integrals over densities.28 Von Mises used the notion of a function of
bounded variation, which was central in the contemporary, modern theory of real func-
tions. Using Stieltjes’s integral, von Mises defined convolutions [“Integralprodukte”] and,
based on that, sums and limits of certain fundamental values of distributions, such as expec-
tation and dispersion [Erwartungswert, Streuung]. The importance of von Mises’s effort to
introduce new notions into probability (including the systematic use of characteristic func-
tions, called “complex adjuncts” [komplexe Adjunkte] in von Mises’s work) was acknowl-
edged by contemporaries such as J.W. Lindeberg, P. Lévy, and G. Pólya.
However, the concrete mathematical progress reached in von Mises’s “Fundamental the-
orems,” for instance in the proof of limit theorems, would remain disputed among mathema-
ticians in the years to come. What is more, von Mises’s controversy with Pólya on the proof of
the central limit theorem, which took place at about the same time in late 1919 as his discussionrvard University Archives, HUG 4574.5, box 1, f. 1910. Fischer (sign:u) to von Mises
card, undated). Emphasis by Fischer. The Riesz paper mentioned by Fischer is Riesz [1910].
Hawkins [1970]. Von Mises as a theoretical mechanist was apparently prepared to take over
jes’s integral into probability, as it had close connections with moment problems in mechanics.
ochkirchen [1999, 39–51].
ises [1919a, 20]. Von Mises said in 1933 about his introduction of what, in more detail, he called
istribution function (!) [Verteilungsfunktion]: “In 1919 the notion of the distribution was
duced by me into the calculus of probability. . . . It has since been taken over by many authors.
Begriff der Verteilung wurde von mir 1919 in die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung eingeführt . . .
st seither von vielen Autoren übernommen worden.]” [Mises, 1933, 761]
n Mises said here: “In the general case of Kollektivs with arbitrary distributions there exist
er probabilities of individual events nor probability densities” [“Im allgemeinen Fall von
ktivs mit beliebigen Verteilungen gibt es weder Einzelwahrscheinlichkeiten noch
scheinlichkeitsdichten”] [Mises, 1919a, 72]. As we have seen, in his subsequent work [Mises,
] he was somewhat more precise, talking about “probability zero” of individual events, instead
xist neither probabilities”.
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 213with Hausdorff (to be covered in the following) showed that von Mises did not have full tech-
nical command of theorems on sequences of monotonic functions.29 As he admitted in his cor-
respondence with Pólya, theorems such as Pólya’s “Continuity theorem of the moment
problem” [Stetigkeitssatz des Momentenproblems] would have greatly simplified his own
proof. Obviously, to be informed by friends and colleagues about recent progress in the theory
of real functions did not necessarily imply that von Mises would engage in that kind of
research himself or even that he would fully understand its theoretical implications.
Nevertheless, von Mises’s paper [Mises, 1919a] remained—in spite of its new notions and
a rather vague allusion to “Kollektivs” in the second part “Applications in the calculus of
probability”—largely within function theory. Even in his second paper [1919b] on proba-
bility theory, von Mises sought—based on principal considerations—primarily the connec-
tion to point functions and the representation of general distributions as functions defined
on k-dimensional intervals. He said this expressly at the point where he now tried to con-
nect the notion of the distribution function in a totally modern way to the notion of prob-
ability as a set function. The only difference between this definition of a distribution
function and our modern notion is that von Mises assumes his notion of a “Kollektiv”
as standing behind the set function:29 Se
1919a
Mise
Ljapu
gener
abou
30 M
distriIt is much more convenient to have to deal with an ordinary point function instead of
with a set function. We therefore aim at representing the distribution within the Kollek-
tiv, i.e., the totality of all probability values, by a function W(x1, x2, . . . xk) of the k com-
ponents of the label [Merkmalkomponenten], or, written more briefly, by WðxÞ. . . . WðxÞ
shall denote the value of WA for the point set A, whose points have the coordinates n1, n2,
n3, . . . nk with nj 6 xj (j = 1, 2, . . ., k). . . . We call WðxÞ the distribution function [Vertei-
lungsfunktion] or briefly the distribution. [Mises, 1919b, 66/67, emphasis by von Mises]Even in the introduction to [1919b] von Mises was hesitant with respect to a set-theoretic
description, and he stressed the applications and their restricted demands on the mathemat-
ics used:The following § 3 offers some purely analytic discussions about ‘distributions’ which are
formulated as set theoretic notions only for the sake of brevity and generality. Those who
do not like this standpoint of great generality can omit theorems 8 through 12 without
problems and take notice alone of the special cases of arithmetic and geometric distribu-
tions which are the only ones which are practically relevant.30Nevertheless, and as briefly mentioned before, von Mises tried in his “Foundations” to
connect the theory with the modern notion of measure. As far as set functions and measures
are concerned, von Mises must have realized as basic facts the (finite) additivity of proba-
bilities of mutually exclusive events and—parallel to this—the (finite) additivity of limits of
relative frequencies of the occurrence of events in trial sequences. This of course pointed toe Siegmund-Schultze [2006], where von Mises’s discussion with George Pólya about [Mises,
] is documented and commented upon. Hausdorff, in his first letter (2 November) to von
s, also contributed to this discussion about limit theorems, referring to the work of A.M.
nov from around 1900, which contained the proof of the central limit theorem under more
al conditions than Mises [1919a]. Von Mises had received the same information from Pólya at
t the same time.
ises [1919b, p. 54], emphasis by von Mises. Note that today “arithmetic” and “geometric”
butions in von Mises’s sense are called discrete and continuous distributions, respectively.
214 R. Siegmund-Schultzethe possible use of measure theory for a general and rigorous foundation of the theory of
probability. That this parallelism could be extended to infinite r-additivity in many prac-
tical cases (for instance, for infinite sums of disjoint intervals of labels) was clear to von
Mises as well.31 If one further considers that in these concrete cases (relevant to applica-
tions) probabilities could frequently be interpreted as Stieltjes integrals with respect to
the general, monotonic distribution (point-) function, which earlier had been introduced
by von Mises himself into probability theory, one cannot avoid the conclusion that von
Mises hoped to profit from the close relationship established between general measures
and Stieltjes integrals due to the works of Lebesgue and Radon. In any case it is worth men-
tioning that von Mises did not dispute the need for a general mathematical theory of count-
ably additive probability, although even Doob admits that31 Se
32 “E
Cara
33 Cathere may well be real world contexts for which the appropriate mathematical model is
based on finitely but not countably additive set functions. [Doob, 1994, 162]Von Mises apparently found a satisfactory point of departure for a set theoretic found-
ing of his notion of probability in the notion of “outer measure” [“äußeres Maß”] con-
tained in Constantin Carathéodory’s book of 1918 Vorlesungen über reelle Funktionen.
Although this notion and its theory go back basically to Carathéodory’s Göttingen lectures
of 1914, von Mises seems to have become acquainted with it only through the book of 1918.
According to von Mises’s personal diaries, he read the book on 18 March 1918, immedi-
ately after its appearance. In August 1918 von Mises submitted his extensive work on point
functions in probability [Mises, 1919a], where general set theoretic notions such as those in
Carathéodory’s book were not yet needed. It was not until 5 February 1919, shortly before
the submission of his second work [1919b] to the Mathematische Zeitschrift (which was
received on 15 March 1919), that von Mises would remark in his personal diaries:At last decisive insight into the notion of distribution, connecting to Carath.32In his “Foundations” [1919b] von Mises claims the following:We can now add that . . . WA is according to Carathéodory’s measure theory a measure
function—though in general not regular—which is measurable for each point set. It fol-
lows—and we are going to use only this particular property of measure functions—that
if the sequence of point sets A1, A2, A3, . . . converges to A, also the sequence of numbers
W A1 ;W A2 ;W A3 . . . converges to WA. [Mises, 1919b, 66, emphasis von Mises]Von Mises refers here to Carathéodory’s notion of a “measure function” [“Maßfunk-
tion”], which assigns arbitrary point sets in Rn an “outer measure l*A”.33 One easily real-
izes the temptation for von Mises that lay in a mathematical notion that assigned a measure
to any set, because one should intuitively expect the existence of probabilities for any set of
labels (sets of elementary events). Hausdorff would show in his second letter to von Mises
(see below) that this intuition of the applied mathematician was deceptive.
Carathéorody’s measure function was apparently even more appealing to von Mises
because it was defined axiomatically by four properties of which three—positiveness,e the remark in his “correction” [Mises, 1920a].
ndlich entscheidende Erkenntnisse wegen des Begriffs der Verteilungen, im Anschluß an
th.”
rathéodory [1918, 238/239], § 235 “Mabfunktionen.”
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ative frequencies.
The fourth property, which von Mises thought (see quotation above) was valid for his
WA too, appeared in Carathéodory’s book as Property III [Eigenschaft III] in the following
form:34 W
addit
35 Iro
abstr
for v
relati
36 SeIII. If V is the union of sets in a finite or denumerably infinite sequence point sets A1, A2,
A3, . . . it is alwaysl*V 6 l*A1 + l*A2 + l*A3 +    [Carathéodory, 1918, 238]
This property of r-subadditivity of the outer measure (which due to finite additivity for
disjoint sets can be sharpened to r-additivity, i.e., the validity of the equality sign)34 corre-
sponded to a property of the “outer content” [“äußerer Inhalt”] m. The latter was a theo-
retical predecessor of the Lebesgue measure, which in turn Carathéodory in his book called
“content” [“Inhalt”] of a set. The “outer content” was based—unlike von Mises’s frequen-
cies—on contents of intervals (products of lengths of edges) in Rn, which allowed the use of
special properties of linear sets in Rn such as the Borel covering theorem (see Theorem 4 on
p. 235 in Carathéodory’s book). Therefore the “outer content” was a special “outer mea-
sure.” Carathéodory added:One can easily find other set functions which also are measure functions. [Carathéodory,
1918, 239]The point was now that von Mises rashly assumed that his WA-set-function was a “mea-
sure function” too.
But Carathéodory had remarked expressly in a footnote on p. 238—a fact von Mises
apparently ignored35—that the axioms of the “outer measure” are independent from each
other, such that in particular r-additivity cannot be derived from the other axioms. In par-
ticular, as Carathéodory pointed it out, this property is not valid for the “inner (linear) con-
tent” [“inneren (linearen) Inhalt”].36
Now Carathéodory defined in § 239 (p. 246) “measurability” [“Messbarkeit”] conversely
as a special property: given an (outer) measure function l*A a set A is called measurable
[messbar] if for any point set W with finite outer measure the following equation holds, with
AW denoting the set-theoretic intersection of A and W:
lW ¼ lAW þ lðW  AWÞ:
This has in particular the following consequence, which looks paradoxical at first sight and
maybe confused von Mises too: each point set has an outer measure (a value assigned) but
it is not necessarily “measurable” with respect to that outer measure!
The subtlety of Carathéodory’s notion probably escaped von Mises’s attention, or he
found it irrelevant for applications. Instead, von Mises may have found further encourage-e will therefore henceforth—in accordance with modern terminology—usually talk about r-
ivity, thereby always assuming denumerable unions of disjoint sets.
nically, the applied mathematician von Mises appears here more seduced by the temptations of
act generalizations than the pure mathematician Carathéodory. The same is occasionally valid
on Mises’s relation to Hausdorff as well (see below). The latter saw the concrete properties of
ve frequencies more clearly than von Mises.
e Carathéodory [1918, 359 ff.], § 338 “Kritik der Maßfunktionen.”
216 R. Siegmund-Schultzement to use the outer measure for his probability theory from remarks such as the following
in Carathéodory’s book (p. 248):37 Th
38 “ÜThere are measure functions with respect to which all point sets without exception are
measurable. . . . Hence measurability is a relative notion, depending on the measure func-
tion used.Finally, Carathéodory introduced the notion of a “regular measure function” [“reguläre
Maßfunktion oder reguläres äußeres Maß”] (p. 258), which requires of l* the additional
property V that the outer measure l*A of an arbitrary point set A is the lower bound of
the measures l*B for all measurable sets B comprising A.
From this it follows trivially—and this is decisive in order to evaluate the degree of con-
fusion in von Mises’s claim in [1919b] quoted above—that an (outer) measure function is
regular, if all sets are measurable with respect to it.
In fact, von Mises had admitted that his special set-function WA, based on relative fre-
quencies, was “in general not regular.” That means that he showed some circumspection.
He was certainly not of the opinion that all partial sets of labels were “measurable” in
the strict sense of Carathéodory. Indeed, the quotation from Mises [1919b, 66] given above
contains a linguistic slip; taken literally, it is logically inconsistent.
Von Mises probably wanted to say that any set has an outer measure in the same manner
as any event has a probability. It is unlikely that von Mises wanted to refer to all analytical
sophistications of Carathéodory’s theory of measurability. That overly “exotic” sets were
not measurable was something that would have barely worried the applied mathematician
von Mises.
Finally, in this section it will be briefly indicated how von Mises tried to exploit the sup-
posed property of his probability function WA of being an “outer measure” in the sense of
Carathéodory. We will see that he used parts of Carathéodory’s theory rather superficially
and did not undertake any deeper measure-theoretic studies. As mentioned above, von
Mises wanted to show the representability of his probability function W as a “Stieltjes-inte-
gral over the point function WðxÞ,” where WðxÞ was the monotonic distribution function
defined by the given probability distribution W.
Von Mises showed first37 that according to the definition of WðxÞ for semiopen intervals
A in Rn, the probability WA can be expressed by simple sums over certain differences
between the values of W ðxÞ in the boundary points of the intervals. These differences were
later in von Mises’s argument recognizable as discrete values (or increments) of the differ-
entials of Stieltjes integrals. Using the finite (!) additivity of his definition of probability, von
Mises then extended the special representation of WA to those A that could be produced as
denumerable unions of semiopen intervals. He therefore expressed WA in Theorem 10 (p.
68) as an infinite series over differences of WðxÞ. In order to extend this formula to more
general, but still bounded, sets A, von Mises now assumed the space Rn partitioned by par-
allels into semiopen intervals with maximum width qk. He defined Ak as the union of all
intervals that have at least one point in common with A and called Ak a “covering of A
by intervals of the width qk.”
38
For qk converging to zero and an arbitrary continuous function f, defined for all points
of A, one has the following Stieltjes integral with respect to the distribution function:e argument drafted briefly here is given in more detail in Mises [1919b, 67–69].
berdeckung von A durch Intervalle von der Weite qk” [Mises, 1919b, 68].
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 217ðÞ
Z
ðAÞ
f ðxÞdWðxÞ:
Von Mises now used for the first time, and without explanation, the limit property of the
probability distribution W, which is equivalent to r-additivity (see above). He specialized f
to f  1, which led him to the following Theorem 11:39 “D
Integ
40 A
originIf A is a closed set the coverings A1, A2, A3, . . . have the set A as a limit, when the widths
of the intervals q1, q2, q3, . . . go to zero. Therefore we have as result of the property of
WA mentioned in the beginning of this paragraph and based on Theorem 10
W A ¼
R
ðAÞ dW ðxÞ . . . [Mises, 1919b, 69]In other words, von Mises concluded from the representability of WA as an infinite series
for infinite unions of intervals (Theorem 10) and from the convergence of this infinite series
to a Stieltjes integral (*) that the existing limit had to be equal to the probability of the limit
set. The latter, however, could easily be of a very complicated nature, and the conclusion
drawn requires the unsecured limit property (r-additivity).
Von Mises’s flawed “proof” shows that his analysis was a far cry from a sophisticated
and deep measure-theoretic argument, and also that von Mises was probably not interested
in such. Compare his argument with the chapter “representation of absolute additive set
functions by generalized Stieltjes integrals”39 in the famous work by Radon of 1913! This
argues in a much more sophisticated way; however, von Mises might have received some
inspiration—on a general methodological level—from this work.
The following section goes into Hausdorff’s objections against von Mises’s first axiom
(Forderung I) and tries to reconstruct von Mises’s intentions, using some historical
conjectures.
4. Hausdorff’s first letter: a pure mathematician’s misunderstanding of von Mises’s intent
Von Mises’s replies to Hausdorff’s criticism are not preserved and can only partly be
reconstructed from several indirect quotations in Hausdorff’s second letter and a few
entries in von Mises’s diaries. Parts of the following attempt at a historical reconstruction
have therefore to remain hypothetical. One has, however, to be constantly aware of the fact
that von Mises as an applied mathematician was interested in the expediency of the theory
for “real world probability”, in particular statistics.
In his first letter to von Mises of 2 November 1919, Hausdorff wrote in the beginning:The set M of those labels which theoretically can occur in the Kollektiv is at most denumer-
able . . .. How can this be reconciled with your remark (p. 56) that M could possibly com-
prise the entire label space and that geometric distributions fall under your scheme too?40Formally Hausdorff was correct with his objection. Indeed von Mises had expressly dis-
tinguished between the k-dimensional label-space [“Merkmalraum”], introduced in his def-
inition of the probability, and the label-set [“Merkmalmenge”] M of “all points which canarstellung der absolut additiven Mengenfunktionen durch verallgemeinerte Stieltjes’sche
rale” [Radon, 1913, 1342–1351].
complete translation into English of Hausdorff’s two letters is given in Appendix; for the
al German, see [Hausdorff, 2006b].
218 R. Siegmund-Schultzeat all occur [auftreten] as labels” [Mises, 1919b, 56]. But if von Mises’s general set-theoretic
definition of the notion of the distribution (see above) is to have any meaning at all, one has
to assume that he understood “occurrence” [Auftreten] not in the narrow meaning of the
label (elementary event) showing up in the denumerable collective. M in von Mises’s under-
standing was apparently the bigger set of labels which could be theoretically assigned to a
given distribution.
In fact, if the distribution arising empirically in applications is to be described as a set
function—in particular, if one has to assume the distribution to be at least partially contin-
uous—it has to possess in general a nondenumerable set of potential labels of probability
zero.41 One may even assume that von Mises’s experience as an applied mathematician—
namely that in numerical calculations only rational numbers occur—suggested to him a
similar case also for the theory of probability. He might have felt that, as in classical anal-
ysis, a comprehensive mathematical theory of probability had to be built around the
denumerable.42
Possibly von Mises hoped that his notion of probability, defined (in the sense of set-the-
oretic inclusion of occurring labels)43 for arbitrary subsets of the k-dimensional label space,
could finally be embedded in a measure-theoretic definition. The latter would then have to
assign to measurable sets (but not necessarily to all sets) a measure equal in numerical value
to the limit of relative frequencies.
Hausdorff himself, in the same letter of 2 November 1919, finally backed away from his
original strong objection and discussed the possibility that continuous [“geometrische”] dis-
tributions could nevertheless be described by von Mises’s definition.
However, Hausdorff, acknowledging this much, then claimed in his letter (unjustifiably
as we shall see) that von Mises considered his set function W to be a measure in Rn in
the sense of the Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure theory. Hausdorff concluded this would—once
again—rule out continuous distributions from von Mises’s definition, because von Mises
demanded measurability of arbitrary sets.44 Note that Hausdorff, in his first letter to von
Mises, did not discuss the concrete definition of von Mises’s set function as the limit of rel-
ative frequencies. He only showed that sufficiently complicated probability measures that
were supposed to cover continuous distributions had to allow for the existence of nonmea-
surable sets. We have argued above that von Mises considered the notion of “measurabil-
ity” in a rather elementary sense, unlike the one we now find in Hausdorff’s first letter.45
The theorem of G. Vitali (1905), according to which sets of positive Lebesgue measure must
contain nonmeasurable subsets, and also that this theorem had implications for other mea-
sures in Rn, was probably known to von Mises. He seems to have hoped, however, that mea-41 Those labels (points) that have positive probability must, of course, occur in the denumerable
sequence of the Kollektiv.
42 It is difficult to decide whether the more comprehensive measure theory or rather the theory of
sequences and their limits have to be considered as idealizations or abstractions from the “concrete.”
Von Mises himself answered the objection that his Kollektivs require finishing an infinite process
(which of course is impossible) by saying that his Kollektivs were “idealizations” [“Idealisierungen”].
43 Compare this to Hausdorff’s definition of probability which was based in a similar manner on the
inclusion of points in sets (see above).
44 See Appendix for the details of Hausdorff’s argument which are, however, not relevant for his
discussion with von Mises.
45 In his second letter, however, Hausdorff responded directly to von Mises’s definition of
probability.
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 219sures could be constructed that would numerically coincide with his definition on the “most
important” subsets. This means that Hausdorff in his first letter went far beyond the level of
sophistication that von Mises had aimed at, using thereby methods that were based on the
axiom of choice (Vitali) and that in part he himself had developed.46
Since, in addition, Hausdorff did not mention, let alone criticize, von Mises’s erroneous
assumption of r-additivity, von Mises must have found Hausdorff’s first letter from 2
November 1919 overly pedantic and in disregard of the needs of “real world probability”
in several respects. Above all, von Mises must have seen the letter as a misunderstanding.47
In neither letter does Hausdorff mention Carathéodory, although it is clear from Haus-
dorff’s work on the generalized notion of dimension from the same year [Hausdorff,
1919] that he knew [Carathéodory, 1914] very well. Generally speaking, Hausdorff seems
to have taken von Mises too literally by his words (such as “measure function”), implying
that he used them in the sense established in pure mathematics and without asking von
Mises for his motivations and without offering constructive proposals for alternatives.
Hausdorff’s letter is, however, more important with respect to von Mises’s second axiom
for his Kollektivs, an axiom which aroused in Hausdorff “most serious logical concerns”
[“die schwersten logischen Bedenken”].48
In his personal diaries, von Mises wrote on 6 November 1919:46 Fo
probl
47 Ho
the fa
betwe
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48 Se
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50 Se
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genscSpent the entire afternoon answering a letter of Hausdorff concerning my calculus of
probability.49He apparently still hoped to be able to convince Hausdorff of his standpoint.
5. Hausdorff’s second letter: the lack of countable additivity and, above all, the lacking
guarantee for the existence (convergence) of von Mises’s probability
Hausdorff responded immediately. In his second letter of 10 November he mentioned for
the first time the fact that r-additivity is not valid for von Mises’s definition of probability.
Indeed, Hausdorff acknowledged that his criticism in the first letter had been somewhat
insufficient or at least not clear enough. He said he hadassumed (what I should have said explicitly) the validity of the limit property (p. 66)
which you mentioned as a resulting property but which you did not include among
the pre-conditions: for An ! A follows w(An) ! w(A).50r example, Hausdorff’s “Paradox,” discussed in Hausdorff [1914b], and “Hausdorff’s measure
em.”
chkirchen [1999, 162], who refers to von Mises’s “Berichtigung” [Mises, 1920a], has pointed to
ct that there must have been a certain “muddling of notion” [“gewisse Begriffsverwirrung”]
en von Mises and Hausdorff because von Mises’s notion was based on Carathéodory’s.
ever, Hochkirchen does not comment on the inconsistency of von Mises’s adoption of the
r measure” as outlined above in Section 3. The commendable work by Hochkirchen is
tunately only available in German.
e Section 6 below.
en ganzen Nachmittag mit Beantwortung eines Schreibens von Hausdorff betreffend meine
scheinlichkeitsrechnung verbracht.”
e Appendix. In German: “Ich hatte (was ich freilich ausdrücklich hätte sagen sollen) . . . auch
on Ihnen angegebene, wenn auch nicht unter die Voraussetzungen aufgenommene Limesei-
haft (S.66) zu Grunde gelegt. . .” [Hausdorff, 2006b, 827].
220 R. Siegmund-SchultzeHausdorff then cited indirectly with the following words an example—unknown to us—
of a “geometric” (continuous) distribution which von Mises had given in his reply. Haus-
dorff maintained that this distribution51 Se
Lime
827].
52 “A
Grun
HUGdoes exactly not have the limit property; here one has for each single pm = 0, and it is
w(M) = 1 >
P
pm.
51If his definition of probability were to have any value from the standpoint of applica-
tions, von Mises had to insist on the possibility of representing continuous distributions
by Kollektivs. If one thinks, for example, of the uniform distribution in the real interval
M = [0, 1], the labels [Merkmale] are a sequence of real numbers, dense in the interval,
occurring with the same frequency in any subinterval of the same length and obeying—
in addition—the random property of von Mises’s Axiom II. That means that in this special
case the labels really occurring in the Kollektiv form a denumerable set M0 of real numbers
which, both as single events and as finite unions, have probability 0 according to von Mis-
es’s definition, while the sequence of relative frequencies with respect to the “occurrence” of
the entire label set M has the constant value 1 in each term and therefore has 1 as a limit. It
follows that w(M0) = 1 >
P
pm = 0, which contradicts r-additivity applied on the denumer-
able union of “really occurring” single events M0 representing the entire label set M. Appar-
ently it was an example of a continuous distribution of this or of a similar kind that von
Mises had sent to Hausdorff in his reply to the letter of 2 November.
As we have seen in Section 3, von Mises was well aware that in nontrivial, nonarithmetic
distributions some labels, understood as single, elementary events, had probability zero. In
addition, he must have known that—due to the finite additivity of the limits of relative fre-
quency—the probabilities of the finite sets (events) Kn in the monotone sequence {Kn} of
the union of those possibly repeating labels xk of the Kollektiv (with w(xk) = pk) that occur
within the first n trials can never exceed the sum of probabilities of labels with positive
probability
P
pm. Von Mises, knowing about the special role of sets of probability zero,
cannot have been too impressed by Hausdorff’s mere reference to the inequality
w(M) = 1 >
P
pm, which in a strict sense rules out r-additivity, at least for the denumerable
union of all single events (labels) occurring in the sequence of the Kollektiv. He probably
considered this as a trivial case of a denumerable union and possibly even as a confirmation
that nondiscrete distributions behave differently.
In fact, at his first reading, von Mises was not very impressed by Hausdorff’s letter. He
wrote in his diary on 14 November 1919: “Meanwhile new letter from Hausdorff on my
Foundations” [“Inzwischen auch neuer Brief von Hausdorff über die Grundlagen”]. And
he added one day later, on 15 November:In the evening also about Hausd. objection Discover a certain inconsistency in my Foun-
dations concerning the measurability of the W-sets, which is, however, not at all
fundamental.52e Appendix. In German: “Das Gegenbeispiel . . . das Sie mir citieren, hat eben die
seigenschaft nicht; hier ist jedes einzelne pm = 0 und W(M) = 1 >
P
pm” [Hausdorff, 2006b, p.
bends auch wegen Hausd. Einwand. Entdecke eine gewisse Unrichtigkeit in meinen
dlagen, betreffend die Messbarkeit der W-Mengen, die aber keineswegs durchgreifend ist.”
4574.2, Diaries 1903–1952.
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he did not talk about the limit property (r-additivity) but about the “the measurability of
the W-sets.”
Somewhat surprisingly, however, it finally turned out that von Mises was impressed by
Hausdorff’s letter. He admitted in a “correction,” published in the Mathematische
Zeitschrift the following year, that he had to drop the limit property (r-additivity) for
his probability function altogether and could only claim finite additivity (which of course
results in r-superadditivity for existing denumerable unions of disjoint sets):53 “D
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StarkThe remark in the beginning of § 3 (p. 66), according to which the probability WA is a
measure function for each set is based on error—which Prof. Hausdorff in Greifswald
kindly alerted me to. Indeed the W do not—for a denumerable sequence of point sets
A1, A2, A3, . . ., whose union is A—fulfill the condition W A 6 W A1 þ W A2 þ   . Rather
it is always W A PW A1 þ W A2 þ   . The remark has been used only in the proof of The-
orem 11 (p. 69).53Nevertheless, von Mises tried to maintain that r-additivity or at least his Theorem 11
could be upheld for the most important sets occurring in the applications, and he added
immediately:This representation by the point function WðxÞ, which was introduced purely for reasons
of convenience, is therefore not, as Theorem 11 claims, possible for any closed point set
A. Of course it remains valid for arithmetic and geometric distributions, which alone
occur in applications, for any regularly bounded domain A, etc.54Now something in Hausdorff’s letter must have convinced von Mises to come forward
with this disclaimer, and, indeed, one finds some indications in von Mises’s personal diaries.
On 16 November von Mises wrote, according to his diaries, “a long letter” to Hausdorff.
But the next day von Mises experienced a shock and noted:In the morning discovery that I misunderstood Hausd.’s objections which are very justi-
fied. Very unpleasant impression. . . . Strongly disturbed. Unable to do further work.55It followed the entry of 18 November, which documents von Mises’s third letter to Hausdorff:In the morning another letter to Hausd. with an explanation. Very unpleasant. Strong
disturbance of my entire self-confidence.56ie Bemerkung zu Beginn von § 3 (S. 66), wonach die Wahrscheinlichkeit WA Mabfunktion für
Menge sein soll, beruht—worauf mich Herr Prof. Hausdorff in Greifswald freundlichst
erksam gemacht hat—auf Irrtum. In der Tat erfüllen die W für eine abzählbare Reihe von
tmengen A1, A2, A3, . . ., deren Vereinigung A ist, nicht die Bedingung W A 6 W A1 þ W A2 þ   ,
ehr ist stets W A PW A1 þ W A2 þ   . Von der Bemerkung ist nur zum Beweise von Satz 11 (S.
ebrauch gemacht worden” [Mises, 1920a]. Emphasis by von Mises. Clearly von Mises assumes
nt sets without saying so.
iese—der Bequemlichkeit halber eingeführte—Darstellung durch die Punktfunktion WðxÞ ist
icht, wie es Satz 11 behauptet, für jede abgeschlossene Punktmenge A möglich. Natürlich gilt
ei Beschränkung auf die praktisch allein vorkommenden arithmetischen oder geometrischen
ilungen, für jedes regulär begrenzte Gebiet A usf.” [Mises, 1920a].
id.: “Morgens Entdeckung dass Einwände von Hausd. von mir missverstanden und sehr
htigt sind. Sehr unangenehmer Eindruck. . . ..ausserordentlich stark gestört. Nicht fähig zu
er Arbeit.”
id.: “Morgens neuerlichen Brief an Hausd. mit entsprechender Erklärung. Sehr unangenehm.
e Störung des ganzen Selbstbewusstseins.”
222 R. Siegmund-SchultzeObviously something had happened after von Mises had reread Hausdorff’s letter. The
decisive question for the historian is now: where in Hausdorff’s second letter did von Mises
find the argument that compelled him to submit his correction [Mises, 1920a] to the Mathe-
matische Zeitschrift?
One has to assume that von Mises, at his first perusal of Hausdorff’s letter, had expected
further “hair-splitting” from Hausdorff’s side (as in his first letter) and found this assump-
tion justified. In particular, von Mises was probably not worried by the missing limit prop-
erty (r-additivity) in his example of a continuous distribution, mentioned by Hausdorff, for
the reasons discussed above. But now a totally new idea of Hausdorff’s came into the
discussion:57 “B
schon
Haus
his fi
58 “N
as coLooking into the problem more thoroughly I discovered that pointing to the limit prop-
erty is not necessary, because already your Postulate I implies that the distribution has to
be arithmetic.57Hausdorff in his letter constructed a denumerable set A that was representable as a denu-
merably infinite union of (set-theoretic) differences of subsets Ka of the label set M:
A ¼ Ka1 þ ðKa3  Ka2Þ þ ðKa5  Ka4Þ þ    :
The subsets {Kn} are (as discussed above) the monotonically increasing sets with probabil-
ities wn containing those possibly repeating labels xk of the Kollektiv (with w(xk) = pk) that
occur within the first n trials. The increasing sequence of the indexes ai which define the set
A was chosen by Hausdorff on the trivial basis of the existence of the probabilities wn.
In his example Hausdorff used only properties of relative frequencies and their limits,
such as positiveness, monotonicity, and finite additivity, without, by the way, making the
use of these properties very explicit in his letter. For example, Hausdorff used implicitly
the monotony of the limits (probabilities) wn = w(Kn) which is based on the monotony of
the sets {Kn}. This ensures that for a specially chosen sequence of increasing index ak the
differences of the probabilities are nonnegative:
wai  waj P 0 for ai P aj:
But was von Mises really worried about the problem of the existence of probabilities, a
fact that seemed so essentially connected to and therefore “guaranteed” by the intuitive
notion of probability? Indeed, when reading Hausdorff’s argument for the first time, von
Mises might have found Hausdorff’s set A “exotic” and of little relevance for applications,
because it does not have an immediate intuitive meaning. Was Hausdorff, as in his first let-
ter, after a hair-splitting proof of the existence of nonmeasurable sets?58
Admittedly, A was in this case (unlike the nonmeasurable set discussed in Hausdorff’s first
letter) a set that was directly constructed out of the labels of the Kollektiv, a set that did not
require higher methods of measure theory for the proof of its nonmeasurability. And “non-
measurability” meant nonexistence of probability (limit of relative frequencies) here, i.e.,ei genauerer Überlegung fand ich, dass die Berufung auf die Limeseigenschaft unnöthig ist und
Ihre blosse Forderung I nur arithmetische Verteilungen duldet” [Hausdorff, 2006b, 827]. See
dorff’s detailed argument in Appendix. Recall that von Mises had not included r-additivity in
rst axiom and merely called it a “resulting property”.
onmeasurable” here, of course, in the sense of the existence of probability, because the sets A
untable sets were trivially Lebesgue measurable.
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 223exactly what von Mises connected to the notion. Therefore von Mises acknowledged imme-
diately in his diaries a minor “not at all fundamental” inconsistency.
On closer scrutiny, however, Hausdorff’s example seems to have revealed much more to
von Mises, namely the following.
A sequence of sets could have a limit in a set-theoretic sense (namely the monotone
sequence of sets whose denumerable union was A) and have probabilities that obviously
had an upper limit, without guaranteeing that the denumerable union had a probability
at all, let alone that upper limit. This must have reminded von Mises of the logical distinc-
tions in the process of rigorization of mathematical analysis of the 19th century of which he
was well aware.
Another fact might have impressed von Mises as well. In the construction of Hausdorff’s
set A, the first index a1 could be chosen arbitrarily large, i.e., one could begin with the con-
struction of the set A by assigning to it an arbitrary finite number of (possibly repeated)
labels occurring in the sequence of the Kollektiv. But this means that the set A is after
all not as “exotic” as one might think at first sight, because it comprised all labels within
the starting set K with the possibly very high index a1. Hausdorff had actually constructed
an entire family of counterexamples. But each of the sets A did not comprise all labels of M,
and they were in this sense nontrivial and different from the infinite union M of the increas-
ing sequence {Kn}.
Most important and most impressive for von Mises, however, was apparently the follow-
ing point:
Hausdorff had shown that the mere assumption of the existence of the probability (limit of
relative frequencies) for the set A implied that the wn of the {Kn} converge towards 1. This,
however, was a clear contradiction of the fact that for a nonarithmetic distribution the wn,
which have to be equal to finite sums of positive probability
P
pm, remain below a bound-
ary b < 1. That means that, assuming convergence to 1, even the finite sums wn =
P
pm
would no longer behave according to finite additivity when reaching a sufficiently high n.
So von Mises must have realized from Hausdorff’s letter that the two properties, exis-
tence of probability and r-additivity, were independent from each other in the sense that
even the restriction to finite additivity did not guarantee the existence of probability for
all sets.
In particular von Mises must have realized that his general construction of coverings
{Ak} for arbitrary closed sets, which he had used in his Theorem 11 for the representation
of probabilities as Stieltjes integrals of the distribution functions,59 was based both on r-
additivity and on the existence of probabilities (limits) for the Ak, i.e., on two unsecured con-
ditions. The Ak were, however, defined in such a general and abstract way that one could
not rule out that they were as “exotic” as Hausdorff’s set A.
This is what von Mises must have seen on the morning of 17 November. At that time he
added the following remark to a letter to George Pólya:6059 See Section 3.
60 This letter, which is discussed and published in the Appendix of Siegmund-Schultze [2006, 499–
500], is dated 16 November 1919, but one might assume that von Mises sent it off only after the
shocking discovery in Hausdorff’s letter on the morning of 17 November. Von Mises was at that
time in a lively discussion with Pólya about his first probabilistic work [Mises, 1919a]. With his
remark about Hausdorff he apparently wanted to pre-empt similar criticism from Pólya’s side.
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224 R. Siegmund-SchultzeOn the occasion of a correspondence with Hausdorff it has emerged that my Theorem 11
in § 3 of the Foundations . . . has to be restricted to more special A, because the remark
on which it relies, namely that W is a measure function, is erroneous.Certainly von Mises had problems in publicly admitting the full implications of Haus-
dorff’s criticism. In his published “correction” [Mises, 1920a], von Mises mentions Haus-
dorff’s construction of a set without an existing limit of relative frequencies only
surreptitiously, with his formulation “each set” [jede Menge].61 This could also be inter-
preted as a reaction to the general measure-theoretic argument in Hausdorff’s first letter.
Instead he discusses his erroneous Theorem 11, which is only indirectly mentioned in Haus-
dorff’s letter.62 However, one does not find in von Mises’s “correction” the clear acknowl-
edgment that even without assuming r-additivity von Mises’ definition of probability as a
set function by means of relative frequencies was problematic. In fact, it did not allow for
nontrivial distributions to decide which sets (union of events) could be assigned a probabil-
ity value at all. Not being in the possession of archival evidence, Chatterji in his commen-
tary even assumes that von Mises “did not seem to have registered the more pertinent (and
perhaps more subtle) fact given in Hausdorff’s second letter.”63
It seems to us, however, that the notes in von Mises’s diaries and his letter to Pólya show
clearly that he finally recognized the point, if somewhat slowly.
In a sense von Mises’s response in his “correction” is—though somewhat dishonest—
consequential. Von Mises stressed those properties which were absolutely essential for
his notion of probability, namely finite additivity, and he renounced the validity of his The-
orem 11 and no longer claimed the notion of the “outer measure” for his work, indicating
indirectly also a matter of less concern to him, the nonexistence of probability for all sets.
It must have been humiliating for the “applied mathematician” von Mises to realize that
the “pure” mathematician Hausdorff had seen more clearly the implications of the concrete
mathematical notion of the limit of relative frequencies. Using simple tools of mathematical
analysis such as upper and lower limits of sequences and not referring to any modern
sophisticated measure-theoretic notions, Hausdorff had shown a contradiction in von Mis-
es’s theory. In a way von Mises’s mistake can be compared to errors of a long bygone age in
analysis, such as those occurring in the unjustified use of the so-called Dirichlet principle in
the calculus of variations. In fact the property (here the existence of probability of sets) of a
sequence was assumed to be transferable on the limit (here the denumerable union A of the
sets). On other occasions von Mises had shown his keen awareness of the achievements of
the critical age of analysis in the 19th century, when Dirichlet’s principle had been criticized
by Weierstrass and others.64
In a way, one could criticize Hausdorff’s second letter, like his first one, for not suffi-
ciently exhibiting in detail the weaknesses in von Mises’s argument and, above all, for
not being very constructive in searching for connections between the undoubtedly impor-
tant notion of relative frequency and the desired rigorous mathematical notion of
probability.though one has to admit that the words are emphasized in print.
ith a proposal at the end of Hausdorff’s letter to put “the definition W(A) = Stieltjes-Integral if
ts” (“Definition W(A) = Stieltjes-Integral falls dieses existiert”) at the beginning of von Mises’s
y. See the quotation from Hausdorff’s letter below.
atterji [2006, 830].
e for instance von Mises’s remarks in the introduction to Mises [1919a] as quoted in Siegmund-
ltze [2006, p. 438].
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 225Also, Hausdorff’s “further reduction” of Axiom I, where he—apparently without moti-
vation—assumed
P
pm = 1 from the beginning, probably seemed like another “hair-split-
ting” argument to von Mises.65 Furthermore, Hausdorff’s example of the set A did not
rule out that von Mises’s definition—for an appropriately reduced measure-algebra—could
describe nondiscrete distributions too. This much Hausdorff seems to admit in his letter:65 It
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the dIn order to extend [the notion of the Kollektiv] in such a way that it comprises geometric
distributions too, you have to restrict Postulate I and to characterize closer those A for
which w(A) shall exist. Even then w(A) does not have yet the limit property, i.e., it behaves
formally like the Jordan content, not like Lebesgue’s measure. Presumably another selec-
tion should be necessary, in order to find the realm of sets [Kreis von Mengen] A for
which w(A) has the limit property too.
Whether given all these difficulties, to which add the problems of the axiom of irreg-
ularity, your collective can still be used as a basic notion, whether it is not advisable, sim-
ply to put the distribution function in the beginning [with the definition W(A) = Stieltjes-
Integral if the latter exists] seems worth closer examination.66The deeper connections between the existence of probability and r-additivity, which not
even Hausdorff may have seen sufficiently clearly at that point in time, became visible only
in more general measure-theoretic investigations, as for instance in the theorem of Vitali–
Hahn–Saks to be discussed in Section 7.
In a certain sense, von Mises followed Hausdorff’s advice by abstaining from further
efforts to build his notion of probability on measure-theoretic grounds. However, he stuck
to his two “postulates” (axioms), accepting complicated criteria and operations following
from them,67 because to him the axioms seemed to be the best guarantee of describing gen-
uinely probabilistic situations, relevant to real applications as opposed to purely fictitious
and inner-mathematical investigations based on measures. One can read Hausdorff’s advice
also as a kind of indirect acknowledgment of von Mises’s first probabilistic work of 1919
[Mises, 1919a], where indeed the distribution function in its relation to the Stieltjes integral
was put on top of the theory, although without connecting it to measure theory at thatappears that the great and usually very careful mathematician Hausdorff made a slip in this
ular argument, because he presupposes arithmetic distributions, which are the ones whose
sity he wants to prove. However, the argument can also be considered as a kind of converse of
onstruction of Hausdorff’s set A. It showed conversely that for discrete distributions, there
not occur problems for the existence of limits of relative frequencies and therefore for the
urability of arbitrary subsets.
e Appendix. In German: “Um [den Collektivbegriff] also so auszudehnen, dass er auch
etrische Vertheilungen umfasst, müssen Sie die Forderung I in diesem Umfange fallen lassen
iejenigen Mengen A näher charakterisieren, für die w(A) existieren soll. Ferner hat dann w(A)
nicht die Limeseigenschaft, verhält sich also formal wie der Jordansche Inhalt, nicht wie das
sguesche Mass; und es wäre ev. eine weitere Aussonderung erforderlich, um einen Kreis von
en A aufzustellen, für den w(A) auch die Limeseigenschaft hat. Ob mit allen diesen
ierigkeiten, zu denen noch die des Axioms der Regellosigkeit kommen, Ihr Collectiv sich noch
Grundbegriff eignet, oder ob es dann nicht gerathener ist, einfach eine Vertheilungsfunktion an
itze zu stellen [mit der Definition w(A) = Stieltjes-Integral, falls dieses existiert] scheint näherer
legung werth” [Hausdorff, 2006b, p. 829].
particular the “combining” of Kollektivs (random variables), the definition of independence of
ktivs, etc. These details of von Mises’s theory, which historically mitigated against it as much as
ifficulties in the foundations (axioms), cannot be discussed here.
226 R. Siegmund-Schultzepoint. Von Mises continued to believe in the central role of Stieltjes integrals in representing
probabilities WA in practically relevant cases.
68
6. A short excursus: Hausdorff’s criticism of von Mises’s second postulate defining his
Kollektivs
Hausdorff was even more critical with respect to von Mises’s second postulate (axiom),
the random property. The postulate of the “irregularity of the correspondence” [“Regel-
losigkeit der Zuordnung”] caused on the part of Hausdorff “most severe logical concerns”
[“schwerste logische Bedenken”].69 Because it was von Mises himself who put the greatest
emphasis on the introduction of some condition of randomness into his probability theory,
we recapitulate here some of Hausdorff’s critical remarks in his two letters of November
1919, although they do not form the main thrust of this article.
With his rather intuitive and example-based Postulate II, which demands the invariance
of the limit (probability) for such “admissible” [“zulässige”] selections of subsequences that
do not use any information about the labels actually occurring, von Mises wanted to secure
“the randomness of the correspondence of the labels to the single elements” [“zufallsartige
Zuordnung von Merkmalen an die einzelnen Elemente”] of the Kollektiv and thus the
“impossibility of a gambling system” [“Unmöglichkeit eines Spielsystems,” Mises, 1919b,
58]. As indicated above, von Mises was critical with respect to Émile Borel’s theory of “nor-
mal numbers” because one could “talk at most about ‘improper probabilities’” [“höchstens
von ‘uneigentlichen Wahrscheinlichkeiten’ sprechen”] here [Mises, 1919b, 66]. Also, Haus-
dorff’s definition of a probability measure in his Grundzüge der Mengenlehre of 1914 did
not immediately contain any formulation of randomness. Hausdorff himself expressly
remarked that the Lebesgue measure did not in itself imply the multiplication law for prob-
abilities [Hausdorff, 1914a, 417]. It had to be stipulated in addition for independent events.
It is in this sense that one has to interpret Hausdorff’s remark in his letter from November
2, recommending an a posteriori definition of “independence” for Kollektivs, which do not
necessarily obey Postulate II, and claiming that the latter axiom is only relevant for exactly
deriving the multiplication law for probabilities. To von Mises, however, it was essential to
stipulate randomness in the definition of the Kollektiv and then possibly derive dependence
between random variables (Kollektivs) from relations existing between them. He thereby
put up with the difficult problem of a proper mathematical formulation of the notion of
an “admissible selection” of subsequences. He admitted not being able to “prove the ‘exis-
tence’ of Kollektivs by an analytical construction” (“die ‘Existenz’ nicht durch eine analyt-
ische Konstruktion nachweisen”) and thus, in a certain, rather vague sense, he approached
the definition of probability even “more axiomatically” that those probabilists who chose
the measure-theoretic way:68 As
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MisesWe have to be satisfied with an abstract logical existence which lies in the fact that one
can operate with the notions defined in a consistent way. To the problem of the expedi-
ency of the definitions we return in the following section.70indicated at the end of his “correction” [Mises, 1920a] quoted above.
tter dated 2 November 1919 [Hausdorff, 2006b, 826]; see Appendix.
ir müssen uns mit der abstrakten logischen Existenz begnügen, die allein darin liegt, dass sich
en definierten Begriffen widerspruchsfrei operieren lässt. Auf die Frage der Zweckmässigkeit
efinitionen kommen wir im folgenden Paragraph zurück” [Mises, 1919b, 60]. Emphasis by von
.
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 227There exists a broad mathematical and historical literature on the development of von
Mises’s rudimentary notion of randomness, as formulated in Postulate II, and on its influ-
ence in the theories of probability and mathematical logic.71 Suffice it to say here that even
A.N. Kolmogorov, the broadly recognized founder of the modern measure-theoretic para-
digm of probability, appreciated von Mises’s efforts to include randomness within the fun-
damental notions of probability. In the 1960s Kolmogorov was partially stimulated by von
Mises’s Postulate II in his work on the algorithmic aspects of the theory of complexity.
7. The measure-theoretic point of view gains prevalence in the 1920s and 1930s: Hausdorff’s
and von Mises’s positions in the new period of probability theory
7.1. The standpoint of the pure mathematician: Hausdorff
Hausdorff had answered a postcard by Pólya on 6 January, 1920 with the following words:71 So
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HahnMany thanks for your card. The judgment contained in it on von Mises is harsh but not
unjust. Such an untenable notion as the Kollektiv has not been proposed for long. ... In
my opinion Mises’s foundations of probability have failed totally and we are no better
off with them than we are by simply and directly starting with a distribution function
and the related Stieltjes integrals.72The development of abstract measure theory and of its relationship to probability theory
began to take off in the 1920s. A significant, if largely unnoticed,73 event was Hausdorff’s
lecture course on probability theory, which he gave in Bonn in 1923, not published at the
time. Here several ideas of the Ergebnisse-Bericht by Kolmogorov [1933] were anticipated.74
Among the developments in measure theory in the 1920s that are relevant for judging von
Mises’s approach are the theorems on “measure extension” (“Maßerweiterungssätze”) that
von Mises’ occasional partner in mathematical and philosophical discussions, the Viennese
mathematician Hans Hahn, published from 1921 onwards.75
To this tradition, which also has connections to modern and abstract functional analysis,
belongs the “Theorem of Vitali–Hahn–Saks,” which Chatterji [2006] uses in his astute com-
mentary on Hausdorff’s letters, written from the perspective of a modern mathematician.
Chatterji puts into doubt—contrary to our conclusion in Section 5—that von Mises under-
stood Hausdorff’s example of a nonmeasurable set A and claims in particular that von
Mises’ “correction” [Mises, 1920a] was not a response to Hausdorff’s second letter. Inme of this literature, in particular von Mises’s influence on W. Feller, A. Wald, is mentioned in
ort commentary by Chatterji [2006].
esten Dank für Ihre Karte! Das darin ausgesprochene Urtheil über die Arbeit von Mises’ ist
hart, aber nicht ungerecht. Ein so unhaltbarer Begriff wie der des Collektivs ist lange nicht
stellt worden. ...Nach meiner Ansicht ist die M.sche Grundlegung der Wahrscheinlichkeitsr-
ng total verunglückt, und wir sind durch sie nicht besser gestellt, als wenn wir einfach direkt
iner Vertheilungsfunktion und den zugehörigen Stieltjes-Integralen ausgehen.” Contained in
s Nachlass an der ETH Zürich, Hs 89: 237.
ob [1976, 1994], for instance, does not mention Hausdorff at all.
ese lectures by Hausdorff have been edited in the German original with an English
entary by S.D. Chatterji [Hausdorff, 2006a, 595–756]. An earlier commentary is contained in
kirchen [1999, 237–247].
. Hochkirchen [1999, 55–61]. See below for a comment on von Mises’s personal contact with
.
228 R. Siegmund-Schultzehis commentary, Chatterji points to a parallelism between Hausdorff’s example and a con-
clusion that Otto Nikody´m (1887–1974) drew from the “theorem of Vitali–Hahn–Saks.”
The latter is a result of abstract measure theory that stems from the period 1921–1933. Nik-
ody´m’s lemma says basically that a sequence of r-additive scalar functions (measures) on a
r-setalgebra
P
, which converges for all elements (sets) of
P
, defines by these numerical
limits another, usually more complicated (r-additive) measure w on
P
.76
To apply this lemma on von Mises’s definition of probability, with M denoting the full
(possibly nondenumerable) label set:
The relative frequency fn(A) of the occurrence of an arbitrary set A until step n with
respect to a given Kollektiv (sequence of labels) is defined in the following way by the “indi-
cator functions”77 1A(xi) of the denumerably many occurring labels xi:
fnðAÞ ¼ 1n
Xn
i¼1
1AðxiÞ:
The probability of A is then, according to von Mises, p(A) = lim fn(A), if the limit exists. The
fn(A) are for any fixed n trivially r-additive scalar functions for any subset A of M, i.e., mea-
sures on the special r-algebra that corresponds to the power-set P(M), because any of the
first n labels xi which occurs in one of denumerably many disjoint sets Ak with U Ak = A
contributes the summand 1/n to the sum fn.
One now assumes that the fn(A) converge for any one-elementary sets (singletons)
A = {xi}. Indeed, the existence of probabilities for elementary events obviously has to be
considered a minimal condition for von Mises’s theory. This, however, does not necessarily
imply the convergence of the fn(A) for arbitrary elements (sets) of P(M), i.e., the existence of
a probability in von Mises’s sense for an arbitrary set.
If now a given r-algebra
P  P(M) contains all singletons (elementary events), the
lemma of Nikody´m implies that there must exist a set A in
P
for which p(A) = lim fn(A)
does not hold. In the opposite case p would be a measure on
P
and for the at most denu-
merable infinite union of singletons (elementary events) with positive measure pm it follows
that
P
pm = 1, which means a trivial, arithmetic distribution.
Thus the lemma of Nikody´m allows the abstract proof of the existence of a set A, which
Hausdorff had constructed theoretically out of the individual labels. This of course leads to
a much more abstract standpoint (mere logical “existence” instead of construction) with
which an applied mathematician such as von Mises certainly would have had even more
problems than with Hausdorff’s more concrete and constructive example.
To what extent, however, Hausdorff’s special example, designed for the scalar function
of the relative frequency can be considered as an anticipation of the much more general
lemma of Nikody´m, or of the even more general theorem of Vitali–Hahn–Saks, must be left
open as a question here.78 As argued above, Hausdorff did not rule out the possibility that76 For instance in Dunford/Schwartz [1958, vol. 1, 160].
77 These are set-functions, sometimes called “characteristic functions” (not in the sense of
probability theory), and assume only values 1 or 0 according to whether or not a given element lies
within the set.
78 S.D. Chatterji mentioned, in a personal email of 27 November 2008, that the method which
Hausdorff used in the construction of the set A is related to the method of the “gliding hump” that
later played a central role in functional analysis and in the proof of general theorems such as
“Vitali–Hahn–Saks.” It would be tempting to follow this parallelism in more detail, because the
application of the general theorem allows one to regain some of the analytical content invested into
its proof, albeit only in the sense of a general statement of existence.
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 229for an appropriate exclusion of sets (certainly without allowing exclusion of singletons)
even continuous distributions could be described by von Mises’s definition. As we saw, this
possibility was finally eliminated by more general results such as the lemma of Nikody´m.79
Another related achievement by Nikody´m of about the same time around 1930, a gen-
eralization of a previous result of Johannes Radon (1913) to the so-called “Radon–Nik-
ody´m theorem,” gave necessary and sufficient conditions for a countably additive
function of sets to be expressed as an integral over the sets. This turned out to be the final
essential result needed to formulate the basic mathematical probability definitions in the
sense of Kolmogorov (1933) [Doob, 1994, 162].
7.2. Von Mises trying to connect to “real world probability,” but unable to renounce measure-
theoretic methods
Von Mises’s “correction” in the Mathematischen Zeitschrift was a recognition, if not a
fully straightforward and honest one, of the criticism in Hausdorff’s letters. In his correc-
tion, von Mises stressed very much the “arithmetic and geometric distributions, which alone
occur in applications” [Mises, 1920a].
Von Mises regained his self-confidence quickly after his correspondence with Hausdorff in
November 1919. On 15 December he received an appointment at the University of Berlin,80
where in spring 1920 he became the first director of the famous institute for applied mathemat-
ics. There he was appreciated among his colleagues of the “pure persuasion” for his initiatives
and the additional and welcome legitimization that his research gave to mathematics as a whole.
But at the same time, his relationship with the pure mathematicians was not without conflicts,
and his approach to the foundations of probability was sometimes even ridiculed. Both the posi-
tive and problematic aspects in von Mises’s relationship to the pure mathematicians in Berlin
are indicated in the following retrospective remark, which also seems to betray something of a
certain mistrust which pure mathematicians had at the time for probability theory:79 On
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löst.”Only with the appointment of Richard von Mises to the University of Berlin did the first
mathematically serious German school of applied mathematics come into existence. Von
Mises was an incredibly dynamic person and at the same time amazingly versatile like
Runge. He was especially well versed in the realm of technology. Because of his dynamic
personality his occasional major blunders were somehow tolerated. One has even for-
given him his theory of probability. [Ostrowski, 1966, 106]Von Mises himself realized repeatedly in the 1920s and later that he could not do without
the use of general measure- and function-theoretic theorems in his daily research practice,
even though he tried to rule them out for the foundations of probability. In his diaries he
writes on 6 April 1921 with reference to a visit to Vienna (the town where he grew up):In the morning in the institute with Hahn, who gives me a work by Lebesgue which
solves my problems.81When in 1926 Hilda Geiringer, von Mises’s assistant and later his wife, prepared her
degree of habilitation in Berlin, a theorem of Pólya’s on monotonic functions played a role.
This theorem had served Pólya in 1919 in his proof of the Central Limit Theorem of prob-Hausdorff’s still somewhat rudimentary understanding of the notion of a random variable,
marks in Chatterji [2007].
cording to an entry in von Mises’s diary from that day.
ormittags im Inst. bei Hahn, der mir eine Arbeit von Lebesgue gibt, die meine Schwierigkeiten
230 R. Siegmund-Schultzeability theory and had then led to a discussion between him and von Mises, who did not
possess similarly modern methods.82 But in 1926, Geiringer and her professor von Mises
overlooked the exact conditions for the convergence of Pólya’s theorem, and Geiringer’s
habilitation was temporarily jeopardized.83
In December 1931, von Mises himself gave a talk in Göttingen on his probability theory
and was criticized—according to one witness—by the “angry Göttingen mathematicians”
[Siegmund-Schultze, 2004a, 352].
Von Mises, however, continued to emphasize the standpoint of the applied mathemati-
cian in his textbook The Calculus of Probability and Its Applications in Statistics and The-
oretical Physics, which appeared in German in 1931. With respect to the book by
Carathéodory, which had served him in 1918 in his futile efforts for a measure-theoretic
founding of his theory, he wrote here:82 Th
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FälleIt is even more general and therefore much liked by the mathematicians to restrict the
distribution function W(x) only by the assumption that it should grow monotonically
between 0 and 1. The theory of real functions teaches us that in monotonic functions
three forms of growth [Anstieg] can occur: finite jump, continuous growth [Wachsen]
with finite slope, and a third form, where the right hand derivative of the function is
“almost everywhere” zero.84 This would imply that besides arithmetic and geometric dis-
tributions there is a third type, which is not reducible. That this type could have some
future importance for the theory of probability [Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie] cannot be
ruled out, but that is not certain either.85Here von Mises seems to distance himself even from his own general definition in Mises
[1919a] of the monotonic distribution function, when he refers to this as “much liked by the
mathematicians,” while obviously reserving for himself the position of the “real world
probabilist,” who is primarily interested in applications.
At the International Mathematical Congress of Mathematicians in Zürich in 1932, von
Mises said with explicit reference to a paper by Kolmogorov of 1931 when the latter’s
booklet [1933] had not appeared yet:I do not deem it essential for probability theory, at least not in its current state, to focus
on very pathological forms of the function W and the set A... but rather treat generally the
various examples which appear in practice.86 [Mises, 1932, 222]e discussion is analyzed in Siegmund-Schultze [2006].
gmund-Schultze [1993, 373].
n Mises refers here to Carathéodory [1918, 577].
och allgemeiner und daher bei Mathematikern beliebter ist die Annahme, dass die
enfunktion W(x) lediglich der Bedingung unterworfen wird, von 0 bis 1 monoton zu verlaufen.
heorie der reellen Funktionen lehrt, dass bei einer monotonen Funktion drei Formen des
eges auftreten können: der endliche Sprung, das stetige Wachsen mit endlicher Steigung und
ritte Form, bei der trotz stetigen Anwachsens die rechte Derivierte der Funktion ’fast überall’
ist. Danach gäbe es auber arithmetischen und geometrischen Verteilungen noch einen dritten,
weiter reduzierbaren Typus. Daß er einmal für die Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie von Bedeutung
en könnte, ist nicht unmöglich, heute aber noch nicht vorauszusehen” [Mises, 1931, 32].
asis by von Mises.
h halte es nicht für das Wesentliche in der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, zum mindesten im
gen Stadium ihrer Entwicklung, die Aufmerksamkeit auf möglichst pathologische Formen der
tion W und der Punktmenge A zu richten vielmehr die verschiedenen praktisch auftretenden
einheitlich zu behandeln” [Mises, 1932, 222]. Emphasis by von Mises.
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 2317.3. The standpoint of mathematical physicists and von Mises’s philosophical convictions87
It should be mentioned that many mathematical physicists (for instance M. von Laue, L.
Mandelstam) during the 1920s and early 1930s reacted more positively than pure mathema-
ticians to von Mises’s “Kollektivs.” In 1933 von Mises’s former assistant Rudolf Iglisch
named both the “closeness to applications” and the relative “mathematical simplicity”
and therefore practicality of von Mises’s introduction of probability based on limits of rel-
ative frequencies (see further below) as the reasons for its success at the time:87 M
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of LaThe reason why physicists and practical statisticians alike, in case they are at all inter-
ested in the foundations of the calculus of probability, prefer by majority von Mises’s
approach is certainly due to two facts. First, this system takes its building blocks imme-
diately from practical experience—in other words this theory is directly designed for
applications in physics and statistics. Second, it assumes rather few special results from
mathematical disciplines, which are relatively foreign to natural scientists, such as the
theory of sets. [Iglisch, 1933, 471]Even the leading mathematician Johann (John) von Neumann originally adopted von
Mises’s approach to probability in his quantum mechanics. The Russian mathematician
Alexander Khinchin, who in 1930 edited the semipopular book [Mises, 1928] in Russian,
described the favourable attitude of many practically oriented scientists toward von Mises’s
theory in the 1930s as follows:It is the business and the duty of mathematicians to remove these formal defects; ... it is
inadmissible to reject on principle, because of its inherent temporary and purely formal
imperfections, this theory which so brilliantly conforms to the essence and requirements
of scientific practice.88Philosophical issues contributed to von Mises’s approach and to the differing attitudes
of mathematicians and physicists to it. Apparently von Mises’s empiricist standpoint with
respect to probability theory did not go down well with the Göttingen mathematicians,
among them famously Hermann Weyl.89 Although Ernst Mach, the philosopher and phys-
icist von Mises admired, had barely commented on probability,90 the general philosophical
connection between von Mises’s frequency theory and empiricist epistemology cannot be
put in doubt. The frequency theory refers to sequences of observations and thus takes a
halfway position between hypothetical physical and abstractly defined mathematical
objects (sets and their measures), neither of which can be “observed.” Indeed, von Mises’sore on von Mises’s attitude to “physical statistics” and on some of his philosophical positions
nds in the section “Von Mises as pragmatic probabilist: Physical background of his theory” in
kirchen [1999, 164–193]. The material presented here is, however, basically new.
om a Russian manuscript of Khinchin (1936–1940) quoted in English translation in Siegmund-
ltze [2004a, 357].
ere are repeated unfriendly remarks in von Mises’s diaries with respect to the “cloudiness” of
’s philosophy of mathematics.
n Mises writes in 1951 in the preface of the third edition of his Probability, Statistics and Truth:
h was not interested in probability, and Poincaré accepted quite uncritically the point of view
place, who had a laissez faire attitude” [Mises, 1957, v].
232 R. Siegmund-Schultzestandpoint was denoted by the “pure” mathematician J.E. Littlewood as representative of
the “philosophical school” in the theory of probability,91 although the applied mathemati-
cian von Mises would most likely have disagreed.
Von Mises’s philosophical standpoint led him to an early renunciation of rigorous cau-
sality in physics, even preceding the birth of quantum mechanics around 1926. In this
respect von Mises pioneered in bringing about a new relationship between mathematical
physics and probability. Von Mises stressed a “purely probabilistic” treatment of physical
problems, an approach that later on was also adopted in the “purer strand” (compared to
von Mises) of probability theory in the tradition of Khinchin, Kolmogorov, Eberhard
Hopf, and others. Alluding to the paper [Mises, 1920b] and to the book [Mises, 1931],
one historian of probability theory goes as far as to say:91 Th
1953,
92 QuKhintchine’s knowledge of von Mises’ 1920 ideas on ergodic theory can be considered
the route that led to the purely probabilistic formulation. [Plato, 1994, 112]But at the same time, Russian mathematicians such as Khinchin were wary about the
possible conflicts between Machian philosophy and Marxism in the Russian philosophical
environment [Siegmund-Schultze, 2004b].
7.4. Attempts at a synthesis of the pure and applied standpoints: Tornier and others
Parallel to the general development of measure theory in the 1920s and 1930s some
mathematicians, who were impressed by the intuitiveness of von Mises’s approach, such
as Erhard Tornier, tried to examine it in more detail and to save it for the theory of prob-
ability. Particularly in Germany—and paradoxically even after von Mises’s emigration as a
Jew—there were many proponents of the relative frequency theory. As late as 1933, the year
that Kolmogorov gave probability theory its measure-theoretic foundation [Kolmogoroff,
1933], one reads in the Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung in the pub-
lication of a talk given by Erich Kamke in 1931:There is presumably unanimity about the need to define probability as the limit of a
sequence.92Hochkirchen has analyzed Tornier’s works, in particular his extensive “Foundations of
the Calculus of Probability” [“Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung”] in the Acta
Mathematica of 1933, and comes to the following conclusion:Tornier’s results show precisely how far a frequentist can go: a formally reasonable fre-
quency theory will always be a theory which studies contents on a finite algebra (the tran-
sition to a r-algebra is not possible in this context). Tornier had also moved far away
from von Mises’s original intention, to combine randomness with an axiom of irregular-
ity. [Hochkirchen, 1999, 216].7.5. Von Mises’s final admission of defeat
In the 1920s there was for von Mises himself no reason to believe that his approach to
probability and statistics was not the promising and potentially successful one. In 1932 vonis allegedly in opposition to the “mathematical school” of the measure theorists [Littlewood,
54–57].
oted according to Hochkirchen [1999, 208].
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 233Mises even proclaimed victory, without mentioning the unsettled relationship of his “Kol-
lektiv” to measure theory. In his lecture “Problems of the calculus of probability” at the
International Congress of Mathematicians in Zürich 1932, he declared with considerable
confidence:93 H.
shoul
. . . V
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95 ByThe following points of view which my theory of probability has promoted in the past 15
years, seem to be rather generally acknowledged today: (1) The priority of the notion of
“collective” over the notion of “probability,” (2) operating with the general notion of
“distribution,” (3) the clear restriction of the task (Aufgabe) of probability theory to
investigating the relations between distributions. [Mises, 1932, 221]One knows that shortly afterward, in 1933, the booklet published by Kolmogorov intro-
duced a new paradigm into probability theory. It was in particular the superior ability of
the new measure-theoretic approach to define and handle stochastic processes that in the
long run appealed to both theoretical mathematicians and mathematical physicists. In ret-
rospect at least, von Mises’s system seemed to restrict and to complicate applicability rather
than secure the connections of probability theory to the applications.93
Von Mises continued to maintain his standpoint during the 1930s. In the second edition of
1936 of his semipopular book “Probability, Statistics and Truth” [“Wahrscheinlichkeit, Stat-
istik und Wahrheit,” originally 1928], von Mises has one chapter that is devoted to his critics.
Von Mises gives the chapter the following title with exclamation: “A part of set theory? No!”94
It was only late in his life, in the third edition of his book Probability, Statistics and Truth
of 1951, that von Mises himself came to the following conclusion:My first modest attempt to arrive at certain general formulations (“Fundamentalsätze
der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung” Mathematische Zeitschrift, 1918)95 is today, in most
respects, outdated. With the aid of the modern theory of sets and the theory of real func-
tions, it has been possible to perfect the formal mathematical foundation in a manner
that is aesthetically satisfying and not without practical value. This is true especially
for some fairly recent results which have opened up the important field of so-called sto-
chastic processes. [Mises, 1957, vi]But von Mises continued immediately and apparently with some need of the “consola-
tion of philosophy”:Suffice it to say that the detailed development of the tautological side of a discipline
affects neither the need for, nor the content of its epistemological foundation.8. Conclusions
The discussion has shown for one particular example, the relation of measure theory to
von Mises’s notion of the “Kollektiv,” that the emerging rigorous theory of probability
evolved in a complicated interplay of existing disciplinary interests, of individual mathe-
matical competence and philosophical convictions.Freudenthal and H.-G. Steiner put it this way in [1966, 190]: “By prescribing how probability
d be measured, v. Mises restricted the applicability of his system and made it more complicated.
on Mises’ system, which in addition lacked consistency, did not stop philosophical discussions,
lbert’s system of geometry did, but multiplied it. It was even less successful than the system by
es. But it has helped to clear the situation.”
in Teil der Mengenlehre? Nein!” [Mises, 1936, 126].
citing the year 1918 von Mises obviously meant the time of submission of Mises [1919a].
234 R. Siegmund-SchultzeThe principal new source used in the present article, namely two letters written by Haus-
dorff to von Mises in November 1919, reveals a dimension of mutual misunderstanding
between two of the leading spokesmen for pure and applied mathematics of the time,
namely Felix Hausdorff and Richard von Mises. While this misunderstanding was less per-
sonal than based on objective disciplinary interests, not every argument of Hausdorff, par-
ticularly in his first letter, was a constructive contribution to a dialogue between pure and
applied mathematics.
Richard von Mises started his efforts in probability theory from concrete (discrete or con-
tinuous or mixed) distributions, and he wanted to cover all these by a common and practical
notion of probability. This did not rule out, in fact—as one may infer from his philosophy of
mathematics, documented only slightly in this article—it rather included, that von Mises
anticipated a general mathematical foundation for his theory. He apparently hoped that
his colleagues from the “department of pure mathematics” (so to speak) would deliver a com-
prehensive and sophisticated mathematical theory at a later point of time. Indeed, von Mises
expected his theory to stimulate developments within pure mathematics. In fact, he saw the
difference between his probability theory and alternative approaches by pure mathematicians
primarily in different degrees of generality and not in rigor. Von Mises claimed rigor—or at
least the possibility of establishing rigor—also for his more restricted realm of mathematical
notions, namely those relevant for applications. But he was at the same time convinced of the
esthetic, philosophical, and—in the long run—applicable value of general and pure mathe-
matical research, and he developed some pure mathematical ambition too.96
Although one finds certain attitudes of the “applied mathematician” (such as avoidance
of “unnecessary” abstractions, preference of sequences over sets) in some of Richard von
Mises’s positions toward the foundations of probability, the concrete discussion revealed
that von Mises’s notions were not more immediately “applicable” after all than Haus-
dorff’s, and like them they presupposed the completion of infinite processes, based on
mathematical idealization. Once the mathematicians had agreed, as Hausdorff and von
Mises did, that the potential and future applications of probability theory required the
mathematical involvement of set functions and of a theory of measure, including nondenu-
merable sets, in some form, the technical consequences of that agreement for the form of
the theory could not be avoided. Von Mises’s definition of probability, based on (trial-)
sequences and apparently suggested by his experiences and attitudes as an applied mathe-
matician, was doomed to failure. His hope to connect to Carathéodory’s notion of “outer
measure” failed too, not least due to inconsistencies in von Mises’s reception and interpre-
tation of that theory.
Differences in mathematical prowess and erudition and technical sophistication between
the two mathematicians were based on and, at the same time, reinforced their differing
research interests. The applied mathematician von Mises, originally trained as a mechanical
engineer, could not avoid feeling somewhat humiliated by the mathematically more erudite
Hausdorff. Sometimes von Mises revealed traits of an inferiority complex vis-à-vis pure
mathematicians, though he carefully hid this from the public.
With Hausdorff’s letters mostly arguing on the level of pure and technical mathematics,
von Mises’s peculiar understanding of probability in its relations to both physics and phi-
losophy could not lend him much support in the discussion. The broader standpoint of von96 In the summer of 1924—for example—von Mises was busy on a daily basis with the “millennium
problem” of the Riemann conjecture (personal diaries).
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 235Mises, which also included randomness built into probability theory as a fundamental
notion, could only briefly be indicated in this article.97
A short look at the later development of the measure-theoretic approach to probability
revealed—when comparing a lemma by Otto Nikody´m with the concrete counterexample
forwarded by Hausdorff in his second letter to von Mises—that increasing purification
and generality of the mathematical argument could potentially come at the cost of losing
concreteness and applicability of the theory of probability. But the same example shows
that more often than not the abstract standpoint implied gains as well, namely here the
principal exclusion of r-additive measures for von Mises’s notion of probability, which
had not yet been secured by Hausdorff’s counterexample.
In the main, the discussion between von Mises and Hausdorff contributed to finding the
necessary balance between avoiding a theoretically untenable mixing of empirical and log-
ical elements (feared by Hausdorff in von Mises’s theory) and the danger of too far distanc-
ing a mathematical pure theory of probability from the concrete applications (as feared by
von Mises). The episode described in this article can therefore be seen as an example for the
complicated, both stimulating and hampering historical relation between “real world prob-
ability” and “mathematical probability” as described by Doob in 1994, with both actors,
however, remaining more on the mathematical side of the divide and acknowledging (if
in von Mises’s case hesitatingly) the logical demands of the theory.
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Greifswald, Graben 5, 2 November, 1919
Dear colleague!
I thank you for kindly sending your interesting papers on the calculus of probability. I do
share your opinion that this discipline needs better foundations than hitherto. But precisely
therefore I do not want to withhold from you several doubts and questions, which I had
already when reading your previous works99 and which have not been solved at all by your
last paper (in Math. Zeitschr. 5).
(1) In your Kollektiv to each element en (or each natural number n) a point xn is assigned
in the “label set” [Merkmalraum]. The set M of those labels which theoretically can occur in97 In particular, in Section 6 and in the penultimate Section 7 of this article, mainly referring to
existing literature.
98 The two letters in handwritten German are contained in the Richard von Mises Papers at the
Harvard University Archives HUG 4574.5.3. I thank the Harvard Archives for permitting the
publication of an English translation. All footnotes are mine. German words in brackets are the
original, used for explanation. Underlining in the text is original by Hausdorff.
99 It is unclear which works Hausdorff is referring to here. He mentions later in his letter the two
papers [Mises, 1919a, 1919b]. Von Mises had published little on probability at that point of time
except for a paper on cyclical error theory [Mises, 1918], which contains the von Mises circular
distribution still used today. For a discussion see Siegmund-Schultze [2006].
236 R. Siegmund-Schultzethe Kollektiv is therefore at most denumerable and the distribution necessarily an “arith-
metical” one (p. 71 your last work100). How can this be reconciled with your remark (p.
56) that M could possibly comprise the entire label space and that geometric distributions
fall under your scheme too?
(2) For your set function WA each point set is measurable (p. 66). This is indeed true for
arithmetic distributions, however only for these, such that you rule out geometric distribu-
tions also this way. Because (assuming for simplicity the label set is one-dimensional) be
W(x) the value of WA for the set n 6 x; be y = u(x) the function which assumes W(x) at
points of continuity of W(x) and passes through all values from W(x  0) to W(x + 0) at
a point of discontinuity (jump). This way the x-axis is monotonically mapped on the inter-
val (0, 1) of the y-axis and W A ¼
R
A dWðxÞ is the Lebesgue measure of the set B = u(A),
which corresponds to the set A under the mapping. Be A1 the set of points of continuity,
A2 the at most denumerable set of points of discontinuity, B1 and B2 their images, then
it follows for a geometric distribution that B1 has positive measure and therefore contains
a nonmeasurable subset B, which is the image of a set A, for which the Stieltjes integral
W A ¼
R
A dWðxÞ does not exist.
(3) The most serious logical concerns for me is raised by your axiom of irregularity [Reg-
ellosigkeit]. What does this mean: a subsequence of natural number is selected without
using the labels connected to them [ohne Benutzung der zugehörigen Merkmale]? If you
select a subsequence according to an arbitrary rule: if it so happens unfortunately
[unglücklicherweise] that the limit changes, you have to dismiss the selection afterwards.
That means you would have to stipulate the invariance of the limits for any subsequence,
and this can only be reached for very trivial distributions (all labels identical except for
finitely many). If you yourself admit in Theorem 5, that a formulation of the assignment
[Angabe der Zuordnung] is impossible, so it simply follows that the notion of the Kollektiv
is not consistent—By the way, the axiom of irregularity seems to me fully dispensable. It is
only really needed for the multiplication theorem of probabilities, and in this case it can be
replaced by a stipulation which defines the “independence” of two collectives101 approxi-
mately in the following manner: be (xn) and (yn) the labels of two collectives, W A1 and
W A2 two probabilities in the first collective, W A1 and W A2 the corresponding [probabilities]
if one preserves only those n, for whom the yn belong to an arbitrary set B of the second
label space, it shall be W A1W A2  W A2W A1 ¼ 0; if this is valid for all A1, A2, B the first col-
lective is independent of the second—I have just discovered that one can do without the
two sets A1, A2 and restrict the consideration to one of them. With respect to B one has
to stipulate that WB in the second collective is >0. If always W A ¼ W A then the first col-
lective is independent of the second; it follows that also the second is independent of the
first. Because if NA, NB, NAB are numbers which say, how many of the N first labels xn,
yn, (xn, yn) belong respectively to A, B, and A  B, one stipulates that for lim NBN > 0 it fol-
lows NABNB 
NA
N ! 0: This is equivalent to that for all sets (also if lim NBN ! 0 or even if NB is
limited) one has NABN  NAN NBN ! 0, which is a condition symmetrical in A and B. I think this
invariance of the limits when selecting according to the labels of a collective independent100 Mises [1919b].
101 Hausdorff writes here the plural “Collective” instead of “Kollektivs,” as von Mises used to do. I
therefore use the English translation “collectives” here.
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 237from the original collective is all that can be saved from your axiom of irregularity, and all
that can really be applied.
With respect to the fundamental theorems (laws of large numbers)102 I want to point to
several works by Liapounoff not mentioned by you (Bull. Ac. Sc. Petersb. (5) 13 (1900), p.
359–386; Comptes Rendus 132 (1900), p. 126–127, 814–815), who probably uses the most
simple and broadest conditions under which the distribution converges according to the
one of the Gaussian law.
I would be glad, if my criticism and your response to it contribute to the clarification of
the foundations of the calculus of probability.
Sincerely yours F. Hausdorff
Greifswald, Graben 5, 10 November, 1919
Dear colleague!
Many thanks for your immediate response!
When I claimed that your notion of a collective only allows arithmetic distributions I
assumed (what I should have said explicitly) not just your Postulate I but also the validity
of the limit property (p. 66) which you stipulate but which you did not include among the
preconditions: for An ! A follows w(An) ! w(A). In particular it then follows for a sum of
finitely or denumerably many mutually disjoint sets
B ¼
X
Bn : wðBÞ ¼
X
wðBnÞ:
If then (x1, x2, . . .) is a collective, xn the label assigned to the number n, and be M = {n1,
n2 , . . .} the at most denumerable set of the really occurring labels, such that each xn is equal
to one and only one nn, furthermore pm = w(nm), it results for any set A that w(A) =
P
pa,
taken over all na belonging to A. This is therefore an arithmetic distribution. The counter-
example with geometric distribution which you offer me does exactly not have the limit
property; here one has for each single pm = 0, and it is w(M) = 1 >
P
pm.
Looking into the problem more closely I discovered that pointing to the limit property is
not necessary, because already your Postulate I implies that the distribution has to be arith-
metical. One then has for B =
P
Bn in the beginning only
wðBÞP w
XN
1
Bn
 !
¼
XN
1
wðBnÞ;
from which it follows w(B)P
P
w(Bn). With the terminology from above it follows there-
fore
P
pm 6 1. I now claim that from your Postulate I it follows necessarily
P
pm = 1, be-
cause for p =
P
pm < 1 one can find a A for which w(A) does not exist. Let wn(A) be the
relative frequency of A in the first n terms of the collective; further Kn the set consisting
of the first n labels x1, . . ., xn, and wn = w(Kn). I now determine the growing natural numbers
a1, a2, . . . such that wa2ðKa1Þ is arbitrarily close to wa1 , wa3ðKa2  Ka1Þ arbitrarily close to
wa2  wa1 , wa4ðKa3  Ka2 þ Ka1Þ arbitrarily close to wa3  wa2 þ wa1 , etc. and I define
A ¼ Ka1 þ ðKa3  Ka2Þ þ ðKa5  Ka4Þ þ    (this means x1 . . . xa1 belong to A, xa1þ1 . . . xa2
belong to the complement B, in case they do not belong already to A, xa2þ1 . . . xa3 again be-
long to A, in case they do not belong already to B, etc.). It is wa1ðAÞ ¼ 1, wa2ðAÞ ¼ wa2ðKa1Þ,
wa3ðAÞ ¼ wa3ðKa2  Ka1Þ; etc. and these numbers are arbitrarily close to 1, wa1 ,
1  (wa2  wa1 ), wa3  wa2 þ wa1 , 1  (wa4  wa3 þ wa2  wa1 ), . . .102 Hausdorff refers here to von Mises’s first paper in the Mathematische Zeitschrift [Mises, 1919a].
See the discussion in Siegmund-Schultze [2006].
238 R. Siegmund-SchultzeThe odd terms of this sequence converge to 1  ½ðwa2  wa1Þ þ ðwa4  wa3Þ þ   ; the even
ones to wa1 þ ðwa3  wa2Þ þ ðwa5  wa4Þ þ   ; the difference between the two limits is 1 
[wa1 þ ðwa2  wa1Þ þ    ] = 1  lim wn = 1  p > 0; therefore limwnðAÞ  limwnðAÞP 1  p:
Therefore: it has to be
P
pm = 1. For a set A one then has w(A)P
P
pa for those na
belonging to A; equally one has for the complement w(B)P
P
pb and because ofP
pm = 1 the equality sign must hold, therefore w(A) =
P
pa. Here both your postulate I
and the limit condition are fulfilled, but the distribution is only arithmetical.
One can even further reduce your postulate I without other distributions than arithmet-
ical ones occurring.103 If I only assume the existence of the limits pm (i.e., the existence of the
probabilities for each label), as well as
P
pm = 1, the argument goes like this:
if we call limwnðAÞ ¼ wðAÞ; limwnðAÞ ¼ wðAÞ we have for sets A, B without common
points because of wn(A + B) = wn(A) + wn(B):
wðAÞ þ wðBÞP wðA þ BÞP wðAÞ þ wðBÞP wðA þ BÞP wðaÞ þ wðBÞ
If in particular B is the complement of A with respect to the entire label set, one has
according to the formulas in the middle
wðAÞ þ wðBÞ ¼ 1:
If now A as above contains the labels na, one has wðAÞP
P
pa, further wðBÞP
P
pb, and
wðAÞ 6 1 P pb ¼P pa, and therefore wðAÞ ¼ wðAÞ ¼P pa; w(A) exists for any set. It re-
mains (if my previous reflections are correct as I hope) that your notion of a collective a
priori only allows arithmetical distributions. In order to extend it in such a way that it com-
prises geometric distributions too, you have to restrict Postulate I and to characterize closer
those A for which w(A) shall exist. Even then w(A) does not yet have the limit property, i.e.,
it behaves formally like the Jordan content, not like Lebesgue’s measure. Presumably an-
other selection should be necessary, in order to find the group of sets [Kreis von Mengen]
A for which w(A) has the limit property too.
Whether given all these difficulties, to which have to be added the problems of the axiom
of irregularity, your collective can still be used as a basic notion, whether it is not advisable,
simply to put the distribution function in the beginning [with the definition W(A) = Stielt-
jes-Integral if the latter exists] seems worth a closer examination.
I am no more at ease with the difficulty or inconsistency of the random-axiom
[Zufälligkeitsaxiom] after your argumentation. The aim which you have, namely the hope-
lessness [Aussichtslosigkeit] of a gambling system is certainly commendable; there remains
only the question how it can be realized mathematically. You insist on the word coinciden-
tally [zufälligerweise]104 which—coincidentally—occurs in my objection, but the truth of
the matter is simply the following: if one selects a subsequence and the limit changes it
has not been a collective; that is why one has to stipulate for a collective invariance of
the limits for any selection, which is only possible for a trivial distribution. I have myself
tried to find out how your irregularity-axiom could be saved: maybe by stipulating the
invariance of the limits for almost [beinahe] all subsequences (in this case one would have
to introduce a notion of measure for the sets consisting of sequences of natural numbers,103 This formulation seems somewhat ambiguous because Hausdorff claims further below
arithmetic distributions. Nevertheless the argument shows the existence of the probability for
arbitrary sets in the case of arithmetic distributions.
104 In fact, Hausdorff had not used the word “coincidentally” in his first (handwritten!) letter, but
rather “unfortunately” [unglücklicherweise] (see above). Maybe von Mises misread a passage here.
Hausdorff versus von Mises in probability 239where the exceptional sequences would be allowed to form a set of measure zero, or simi-
lar). Under all circumstances this would lead to severe complications and it would destroy
beyond hope the simplicity of these basic notions.
I am looking forward to your reply with the utmost interest. With best wishes very sin-
cerely yours F. Hausdorff.
Archival sources
Richard von Mises Papers, Harvard University Archives HUG 4574, in particular von
Mises’ personal diaries at HUG 4574.2, Diaries 1903–1952 and his correspondence.
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